An incident took place when phosphoric acid was inadvertently unloaded into a storage tank containing 12.5% Sodium Hypochlorite solution. The resulting chemical reaction of the two caused a chlorine gas release which affected the field operator. In another incident, a chemical that could be thermally decomposed was inadvertently stored near a steam pipe. The resulting heat transfer from the steam pipe caused a thermal decomposition later caused a fire in the warehouse in which the chemical was stored. Many of us do not treat chemicals with the respect they deserve. MSDS need to be understood by the people who handle chemicals. It is not just a matter of pasting the MSDS in the place where the chemicals are stored. it is a matter of understanding them.
February 28, 2011
Know the chemicals you deal with
February 25, 2011
Accident to truck carrying hydrogen cylinders
The local news article link is attached.
February 24, 2011
Temporary solutions - permanent problems!
Read about a boiler explosion that occurred due to a temporary change in this link.
February 22, 2011
A Bhopal in the USA?
"Bhopal should have been a wake up call, but it is unclear whether chemical plants around the world are any safer a quarter century after the December 1984 disaster—during which some 40 tons of toxic methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant owned by Union Carbide (now part of Dow Chemical), killing 2,259 people immediately and causing lifelong health problems and premature death for tens of thousands more.
In the U.S., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) oversees chemical and other facilities that deal with hazardous materials, making sure various “process safety” routines are followed so as to “prevent or minimize the catastrophic injury or death that could result from an accidental or purposeful release of toxic, reactive, flammable or explosive chemicals.” Also, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security instituted its own “Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards” (CFATS) that chemical and other hazardous materials facilities must follow or be shut down.
While this system has worked pretty well in the U.S. so far, some worry that a Bhopal-scale tragedy, whether due to an accident or terrorist attack, could still occur on American soil. For one, water treatment and port facilities are exempt from CFATS altogether, so some of the nation’s largest chemical facilities are not subject to as rigorous standards as they could be. A 2009 bill that passed the House of Representatives but failed to make it through the Senate addressed this and other issues. Supporters are optimistic that the bill in one form or another could resurface in future legislative sessions".
Read the article in this link
February 21, 2011
And the Flare goes "BOOM" at night!
For a good presentation on flare systems see this link
February 19, 2011
Read these process incidents
1. Combustible dust explosion in motorcycle rim manufacturing facility
2. Fire and explosion in LPG facility
3. Fire and explosion in LPG storage
4. Fire and explosion in biotechnology factory (static electricity)
5. Fire in bulk petroleum storage tanks
6. Fire and storage in LPG storage facility
7. Combustible dust explosion
February 17, 2011
The Buncefield Investigation - be prepared to see similar findings elsewhere
"Fundamental safety management failings were the root cause of Britain's most costly industrial disaster, a new publication reveals.
- Systems for managing the filling of industrial tanks of petrol were both deficient and not fully implemented
- An increase in the volume of fuel passing through the site put unsustainable pressure on those responsible for managing its receipt and storage, a task they lacked information about and struggled to monitor. The pressure was made worse by a lack of necessary engineering support and other expertise.
- A culture developed where keeping operations going was more important than safe processes, which did not get the attention, resources or priority status they required.
- Inadequate arrangements for containment of fuel and fire-water to protect the environment.
- There should be a clear understanding of major accident risks and the safety critical equipment and systems designed to control them.
- There should be systems and a culture in place to detect signals of failure in safety critical equipment and to respond to them quickly and effectively.
- Time and resources for process safety should be made available.
- Once all the above are in place, there should be effective auditing systems in place which test the quality of management systems and ensure that these systems are actually being used on the ground."
Read the HSE report in this link.
February 16, 2011
Hazards of low oxygen inside confined spaces
Today there are accidents that still continue to happen on the above lines. Learn from history. Do not allow more people to die.
February 14, 2011
Another natural gas explosion
February 13, 2011
Preventing fires in thermal fluid systems
"Fluid leaking from valves, gasketing,welds or instrument ports finds its way into porous insulation and wicks through. Remaining as hot as the system itself, the fluid comes into intimate contact with the air in the insulation's millions of pockets. As it enters each pocket, the fluid oxidizes and decomposes—in the process using up the existing air and creating heat. Confined within the insulation, the heat has little chance of escaping. The continued oxidation causes temperatures to rise. In some cases temperatures may exceed the autoignition point of the fluid. Should the insulation be opened up when the system is hot, fresh air will immediately enter. Coming into contact with the hot, partially oxidized fluid, fresh air can cause spontaneous ignition resulting in a smoldering fire, or a flash".
The paper also recommends precautions to be taken in component selection, installation and maintenance.
Read the paper in this link. Read another article on Prevent fires in thermal fluids
Disclaimer: I am not advocating any product and am sharing this information in the interest of process safety
February 12, 2011
CSB safety videos
Hydrogen gas detection in refineries
"There are several hazards associated with hydrogen, ranging from respiratory ailment, component failure, ignition, and burning. Although a combination of hazards occurs in most instances, the primary hazard with hydrogen is the production of a flammable mixture, which can lead to a fire or explosion. Because its minimum ignition energy in air at atmospheric pressure is about 0.2 mJ, hydrogen is easily ignited. In oil refineries, the first step in the escalation of fire and detonation is loss of containment of the gas. Hydrogen leaks are typically caused by defective seals or gaskets, valve misalignment, or failures of flanges or other equipment. Once released, hydrogen diffuses rapidly. If the leak takes place outdoors, the dispersion of the cloud is affected by wind speed and direction and can be influenced by atmospheric turbulence and nearby structures. With the gas dispersed in a plume, a detonation can occur if the hydrogen and air mixture is within its explosion range and an appropriate ignition source is available. Such flammable mixture can form at a considerable distance from the leak source.
In order to address the hazards posed by hydrogen, manufacturers of fire and gas detection systems work within the construct of layers of protection to reduce the incidence of hazard propagation. Under such a model, each layer acts as a safeguard, preventing the hazard from becoming more severe.The detection layers themselves encompass different detection techniques that either improve scenario coverage or increase the likelihood that a specific type of hazard is detected. Such fire and gas detection layers can consist of catalytic sensors, ultrasonic gas leak monitors, and fire detectors. Ultrasonic gas leak detectors can respond to high pressure releases of hydrogen, such as those that may occur in hydrocracking reactors or hydrogen separators. In turn, continuous hydrogen monitors like catalytic detectors can contribute to detecting small leaks, for example, due to a flange slowly deformed by use or failure of a vessel maintained at close to atmospheric pressure. To further protect a plant against fires, hydrogen-specific flame detectors can supervise entire process areas. Such wide coverage is necessary: Because of hydrogen cloud movement, a fire may be ignited at a considerable distance from the leak source".
Read the article in this link (pdf file -be patient)
Disclaimer: The reader is recommended to to do a survey before purchasing detectors.
February 10, 2011
Natural gas pipeline explosion and ethanol rail tankers derailing incidents
Another incident involved the derailment and catching fire of ethanol rail tankers near Ohio. The article mentions that "Twenty-six cars of a 62-car Norfolk Southern train jumped the tracks at about 2:20 a.m. in Cass Township, and the contents of those that ruptured in the impact caught fire. The denatured ethanol in other tank cars that were not breached immediately was heated by the flames until it boiled and the tanks could no longer withstand the pressure, causing explosions that sent fireballs bursting spectacularly into the sky".
Read the article in this link.
Students campaign - "Crackdown on cracking crackers"
February 9, 2011
Exothermic explosion causes serious injury
"An investigation by the HSE revealed that approximately five times too much hydrogen peroxide was added to the sodium cyanide pellets which resulted in an exothermic explosion".
Train your workers on the hazards of inadvertent reactions. Read the article in this link.
Read another article about the same incident in this link.
February 8, 2011
Another tragic confined space entry fatality - train your workers about the hazards
In another incident that occurred some time back, a young engineer in a fertiliser plant in India was killed when he slipped into a vessel under nitrogen atmosphere. He was trying to check the work done inside the vessel from outside when he reportedly slipped inside.
February 6, 2011
Buy the Practical Process Safety Management book and support the Bhopal Victims
Contact me at bkprism@gmail.com for details of purchasing the book. Thanks in advance!
Major fire at MIDC Taloja -Dangers of handling solvents
There has been another Major Fire in one more Chemical Unit located in Taloja - M.I.D.C, near Navi Mumbai on Wednesday, 2nd February 2011.This is a Second Major Fire in Taloja M.I.D.C after the recent ‘Major Fire’ at ‘IOCL, Lube Blending Plant’ - on 18th January 2011. The fire was reported to have been fed by solvents stored in cans. Read the news article in this link.
The American Chemistry Council has published an excellent technical guide on solvent handling which highlights the following when handling solvents::
• "Understand the Solvent
• Follow Appropriate Regulations and/or Standards Applicable to Handling and Storage of Solvents
• Address Potential Ignition Sources
• Understand Conditions for Autoignition
• Maximize Ventilation as Appropriate to the Application
• Maintain Appropriate Work Temperature
• Educate and Train Employees
• Report Leaks and Spills in Accordance with Federal and State Regulations
• Consider Providing Secondary Containment Solutions
• Develop Appropriate Loading and Unloading Procedures
• Consider Developing an Emergency Plan
• Consider Inert Storage Solutions
• Consider Developing Standard Operating Procedures
• High velocity and turbulent conditions, for example in pipelines, or the discharge of jets from nozzles and tank mixing.
• Filtration, particularly through micropore elements.
• Liquid droplets or foam falling through a vapor.For example, a spray or mist formation in vapor
spaces, splash filling of tanks, tankers, drums or intermediate bulk containers.
• Settling water droplets through liquid hydrocarbon. For example, after a line has been pigged off into a tank with water.
• Bubbling of gas or air through liquids.
• Mechanical movements such as belts or pulleys used as air blast coolers.
• The movement of vehicles, fans or even people.
• Movement or transport of powders, although not relevant in the case of solvents. There have been many incidents involving materials such as flour, where static accumulation has caused an explosion of flour dust.
• High velocity release of steam to atmosphere."
February 5, 2011
Dangers of natural gas blowing -CSB Video
Recipe for a dust explosion
"Combine complacency with lack of housekeeping and you have the perfect recipe for a dust explosion.
At too many facilities, the ingredients are already there. All you need is a building with layers of combustible dust, like corn starch. Add unvented equipment that draws in suspended dust. Let a few airborne particles stray and find a spark. The first explosion will rupture the equipment, tossing the building dust into the air. The second will probably collapse the walls. And, if by chance you attached a sprinkler riser to one of the load bearing walls, forget your sprinkler protection. It’s gone. A suspended, combustible dust cloud burns much more violently than a pile of sawdust. When suspended dust particles are completely surrounded by oxygen, they rapidly release a tremendous amount of energy. The pressure wave produced by the initial exploding dust cloud shakes and suspends more dust from other surfaces to fuel a chain reaction of violent explosions. Usually, the second or third explosion is worse than the first.Industries producing dust as a product, such as some pharmaceutical industries, tend to be more aware of the hazards than industries that produce dust as a by-product. Unfortunately, it’s very easy for personnel to overlook the fallout from operations, such as grain handling or furniture making. Then an explosion hits, endangering the facility and equipment as well as the employees".
Read the newsletter in this link.
February 2, 2011
Major fire in Panoli Dyes Pigment unit
In many chemical units especially in small scale sector, flammable chemicals are handled in drums to save storage costs. A flammable chemical stored in a drum is a potential time bomb. The more number of full drums you store, the more is the hazard. It is better you do a monthly drum safety audit to ensure that good work practices are followed. In times of production pressure, managers tend to ignore the hazards of filled chemical drums.
Read the article about the fire in this link.
Gas leak at chemical factory kills three
Read the article in this link.
Plate heat exchangers and hazard free operations
TIP 4: Use a Strainer or Bypass the Unit During Startup
TIP 5: Keep Large Particles Out
TIP 8: Take Precautions to Minimize Port Erosion
TIP 9: Design for the Future, But Purchase on Your Current Needs
Read the article in this link.
January 30, 2011
Ammonia replaced as refrigerant after incidents of leaks
Read the article in this link
January 28, 2011
Chlorine leak in plant affects people and Police officer dies in mock drill
Read the chlorine leak incident in these links
Leak 1
Leak 2
Read about the fatal accident during mock drill in these links
Mock drill fatality 1
Mock drill fatality 2
Thanks to Abhay Gujar for sending information about the incidents
January 26, 2011
Virtual plants - boon or bane?
Ultimately, even if we automate the plants to the fullest extent, it is not possible to control emergencies and plant upsets. These need a trained experienced operator to handle the situation. As we automate the plants more and more there is a risk that operators loose their trouble shooting abilities. Read the full discussion in this link.
January 24, 2011
Lab accident - the dangers of chemicals
CO the deadly killer
January 22, 2011
PSM and the Texas A & M Bonfire - good analysis
January 21, 2011
CSB Report on Bayer CropScience Explosion finds multiple deficiencies led to Runaway Chemical Reaction
The report found that had the trajectory of the exploding vessel taken it in a different direction, pieces of it could have impinged upon and possibly caused a release from piping at the top of a tank of highly toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC).
The accident occurred during the startup of the methomyl unit, following a lengthy period of maintenance. The CSB found the startup was begun prematurely, a result of pressures to resume production of the pesticides methomyl and Larvin, and took place before valve lineups, equipment checkouts, a pre-startup safety review, and computer calibration were complete. CSB investigators also found the company failed to perform a thorough Process Hazard Analysis, or PHA, as required by regulation.
CSB Investigations Manager John Vorderbrueggen noted that a major contributing factor to the accident was a series of equipment malfunctions that continually distracted operators. “Human factors played a big part in this accident, and the absence of enforced, workable standard operating procedures and adequate safety systems meant that mistakes could prove fatal. For example, operators were troubleshooting several equipment problems and during the startup, inadvertently failed to prefill the residue treater vessel with solvent. A safety interlock was designed to stop workers from introducing highly-reactive methomyl, but it was bypassed as had been done in previous operations with managers’ knowledge. Once the chemical reaction of the highly concentrated methomyl started, it could not be stopped, and the temperature and pressure inside rose rapidly, finally causing an explosion.”
Read the news release in this link.
January 20, 2011
Another fire at IOC depot
NDTV has a video in this link.
Catastrophic risk management
"1. Identify catastrophic events which could close your operations down in each of your business units and in each region/country in which you have set up shop. Every element of your product range and geographical footprint has its own set of unique risks.
Events can be classified as "internal" where a multiple failure of in-house systems can lead to catastrophe; or "external" where adverse political, economic or natural developments or shocks can cause premature extinction. For example, the range of events can include accidents, civil wars, state expropriation of assets, market collapse, massive disruption of supply chains and earthquakes/flooding.
2. Imaginatively play a scenario on each event highlighting the causal chain which can lead to the catastrophe and the impact on the business of the catastrophe itself. Where possible, select flags which may indicate a rise in the probability of the event occurring such as the abnormal withdrawal of a tide before a tsunami hits the beachfront.
3. With probability of occurrence on the vertical axis and seriousness of impact on the horizontal axis, locate each scenario on the chart so that you have a real feel for the ones you should prioritise in terms of response strategies and tactics. Which are the real catastrophes waiting to happen?
4. Make a list of all the organisations who have relevant roles to perform in the event of a catastrophic scenario materialising. In particular, work out where they fit in the decision-making structure and specifically the people in each organisation to contact as the disaster unfolds. Remember actions taken in the first 48 hours usually determine public perceptions about your competence in handling the event.
5. Just as a catastrophic fire scenario requires preventative measures as well as emergency procedures should it break out in a building or forest plantation, so each catastrophe scenario should carry its own sequence of pre-event and post-event drills. Each option should be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis so that you have the best drills in place to prevent the event happening and to contain it if it happens.
Simple, but very few companies – even among the top multinationals – practice catastrophic risk management. As for the example I quoted at the beginning on extreme weather events, the pieces that are missing are steps 4 and 5".
Read the full article in this link.
January 18, 2011
Leak detection in buried pipelines
The article also mentions that the technique successfully detected a leak in a buried pipeline carrying brine. Read the article in this link.
January 17, 2011
Risk management - the risk is in the management!
When I conduct process safety management audits, I often observe a huge gap between what is happening at the ground level and the board's perception of management of process safety. The Baker panel report after the BP incident specifically recommended that a member of the board in chemical units must be someone who understands the process safety issues and can communicate the risk to the rest of the members of the board. But this is yet to happen. It is not a question of culture. It is a question of commitment. Without commitment there is no culture.
January 15, 2011
The report on the BP oil rig disaster - familiar lessons, familiar root causes
I have summarized the key points from the investigation report:
"The final moments:
Down in the engine control room, Chief Mechanic Douglas Brown, an Army veteran employed by Transocean, was filling out the nightly log and equipment hours. He had spent the day fixing a saltwater pipe in one of the pontoons. First, he noticed an “extremely loud air leak sound.” Then a gas alarm sounded, followed by more and more alarms wailing. In the midst of that noise, Brown noticed someone over the radio. “I heard the captain or chief mate, I’m not sure who, make an announcement to the standby boat, the Bankston, saying we were in a well-control situation.” The vessel was ordered to back off to 500 meters. Now Brown could hear the rig’s engines revving. “I heard them revving up higher and higher and higher. Next I was expecting the engine trips to take over. . . . That did not happen. After that the power went out.” Seconds later, an explosion ripped through the pitch-black control room, hurtling him against the control panel, blasting away the floor.
Brown fell through into a subfloor full of cable trays and wires. A second huge explosion roared through, collapsing the ceiling on him. All around in the dark he could hear people screaming and crying for help.
Steve Bertone, the rig’s chief engineer, had been in bed, reading the first sentence of his book, when he noticed an odd noise. “As it progressively got louder, it sounded like a freight train coming through my bedroom and then there was a thumping sound that consecutively got much faster and with each thump, I felt the rig actually shake.” After a loud boom, the lights went out. He leapt out of bed, opening his door to let in the emergency hall light so he could get dressed. The overhead public-address system crackled to life: “Fire. Fire. Fire.”
Root Causes (failures in industry):
BP’s management process did not adequately identify or address risks created by late changes to well design and procedures. BP did not have adequate controls in place to ensure that key decisions in the months leading up to the blowout were safe or sound from an engineering perspective. While initial well design decisions undergo a serious peer review process155 and changes to well design are subsequently subject to a management of change (MOC) process,156 changes to drilling procedures in the weeks and days before implementation are typically not subject to any such peer-review or MOC process. At Macondo, such decisions appear to have been made by the BP Macondo team in ad hoc fashion without any formal risk analysis or internal expert review. This appears to have been a key causal factor of the blowout.
Halliburton and BP’s management processes did not ensure that cement was adequately tested. Halliburton had insufficient controls in place to ensure that laboratory testing was performed in a timely fashion or that test results were vetted rigorously in-house or with the client. In fact, it appears that Halliburton did not even have testing results in its possession showing the Macondo slurry was stable until after the job had been pumped. It is difficult to imagine a clearer failure of management or communication.
BP, Transocean, and Halliburton failed to communicate adequately. Information appears to have been excessively compartmentalized at Macondo as a result of poor communication. BP did not share important information with its contractors, or sometimes internally even with members of its own team. Contractors did not share important information with
BP or each other. As a result, individuals often found themselves making critical decisions without a full appreciation for the context in which they were being made (or even without recognition that the decisions were critical).
Transocean failed to adequately communicate lessons from an earlier near-miss to its crew. Transocean failed to adequately communicate to its crew lessons learned from an eerily similar near-miss on one of its rigs in the North Sea four months prior to the Macondo blowout. On December 23, 2009, gas entered the riser on that rig while the crew was displacing a well with seawater during a completion operation. As at Macondo, the rig’s crew had already run a negative-pressure test on the lone physical barrier between the pay zone and the rig, and had declared the test a success.163 The tested barrier nevertheless
failed during displacement, resulting in an influx of hydrocarbons. Mud spewed onto the rig floor—but fortunately the crew was able to shut in the well before a blowout occurred.Nearly one metric ton of oil-based mud ended up in the ocean. The incident cost Transocean 11.2 days of additional work and more than 5 million British pounds in expenses.
Decision making processes at Macondo did not adequately ensure that personnel fully considered the risks created by time- and money-saving decisions. Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)".
For those of you who are interested in reading the complete report, here is the link. (File is large, be patient...)
Another reactor blast....and another tank blast
The blast wave from the explosion reportedly damaged windows and buildings. Blast waves are extremely dangerous. Read an explanation in this link.
Read the articles in this link: Link 1 and Link 2
Another incident reported is the explosion of an ammonia cylinder or tank in an ice factory in Karnataka. Read about it in this link.
January 13, 2011
Bhopal disaster - educating our future leaders
The news article mentions the following:
"The Social Science edition, that was released this month, recounts the story of the Bhopal gas tragedy under the chapter Law and Social Justice. It not only has a report on the industrial disaster but also raises serious concerns about the fate of the gas-affected people and the weak environment laws in the country.It dwells on how taking advantage of weak environment laws and availability of cheap labour, environmentally dangerous plants open in developing nations.
Several photographs of the incident, victims, deaths and protests have been published in the book. The background colour of the pages has been kept black while the headlines and photo captions are highlighted in red colour.
A caption of one of the pictures says: "Dow, how many more must die?"
The account begins: "The world's worst industrial tragedy took place in Bhopal 24 years ago. Union Carbide (UC), an American company, had a factory in the city in which it produced pesticides. At midnight of 2 December, methyl-isocyanate (MIC) - a highly poisonous gas - started leaking from the UC plant..."
"Within three days, more than 8,000 people were dead. Hundreds of thousands were maimed."Most of those exposed to the poison gas came from poor, working-class families, of which nearly 50,000 people are today sick to work. Among those who survived, many developed severe respiratory disorders, eye problems and other disorders. Children developed peculiar abnormalities, like the girl in the photo."
"The disaster was not an accident. UC had deliberately ignored the essential safety measures in order to cut costs. Much before the Bhopal disaster, there had been incidents of gas leak killing a worker and injuring several."
"24 years later, people are still fighting for justice: for safe drinking water, for healthcare facilities and jobs for the people poisoned by UC. They also demand that (Warren) Anderson, the UC chairman who faces criminal charges, be prosecuted."
Criticising government apathy in allowing the factory to come up, a paragraph of the chapter reads: "Government officials refused to recognize the plant as hazardous and allowed it to come up in a populated locality. When some municipal officials in Bhopal objected that the installation of an MIC production unit in 1978 was a safety violation, the position of the government was that the state needs the continued investment of the Bhopal plant, which provides jobs."
It also has a comparative account of Union Carbide's safety system in Bhopal and its other plant in the United States."At West Virginia (USA.) computerised warning and monitoring systems were in place, whereas the UC plant in Bhopal relied on manual gauges and the human senses to detect gas leaks. At the West Virginia plant, emergency evacuation plans were in place, but non-existent in Bhopal."
I hope the contents of the book are not revised!
Read the article in this link.
January 12, 2011
Iphone app manages fatigue
The modular design of the fatigue risk management solution, however, allows operators to make use of alternative alertness models if desired.An iPhone application based on the Boeing Alertness Model called CrewAlert has also been released by Jeppesen. Available in the Apple App Store for $19.99, CrewAlert is billed as "the first app designed specifically to help airlines and their crews manage alertness and fatigue".This is an interesting development and maybe we in the chemical industry can use a similar type of app for managing worker fatigue!
Read the article in this link.
Ammonia leak incidents
It appears that the plant was an "aging" plant. This again raises the question of how residual life assessment of equipment is tracked by companies.Read the article in this link.
Another ammonia leak from a gas cylinder in India which later caused a fire has also been reported. Time and again I see gas cylinders treated with scant respect in many companies. Read the articles about the ammonia incident in these links
Link 1
Link 2
January 9, 2011
H2S leak at manganese plant in China kills 3
Read the full article about the accident in this link.
Bhopal - Pictures speak a thousand words
Purse String Management Vs PSM
Many articles blame it on "poor culture". I would say it in one sentence "short term gains overriding process safety". No amount of behavioural change programs will help unless some one at the top is in a position to understand and recognise the risks that a chemical industry faces. The truth is bitter!
January 7, 2011
BP oil spill- Process safety and its Management
"A "complacent" attitude to safety and a cost-cutting culture by BP's management and that of its partners contributed to the oil spill that ravaged the Gulf of Mexico last year, the official US inquiry has ruled.
A pre-released chapter from the final report of the White House oil spill commission set up by President Barack Obama is scathing in its attack on management failure, warning that the cause of the crisis was "systemic" and that without reform of the industry a similar disaster "might well recur".
"Most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure – a failure of management. Better management by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blow-out," the report said.
It added: "Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean made that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)."
BP staff are accused of making several critical mistakes, including the misinterpretation of a vital "negative pressure test" to check that the well had been properly sealed before removing the rig. The report said BP's "fundamental mistake" was its failure to exercise caution before relying on the cement as a barrier to the flow of oil and gas up the well.
BP's US partners, Halliburton and Transocean, do not escape censure either. Halliburton is criticised for failing to ensure the cement used to seal the well had been tested properly. Transocean, which owned and ran the rig, is attacked for not learning the lessons of a similar incident that almost led to an accident in the North Sea four months prior to the Macondo disaster".
Read the full article in this link.
One killed in explosion in chlorine plant
January 6, 2011
Major fire in depot near Rotterdam
Refinery cited for multiple safety hazards
"The serious violations include failing to provide properly constructed scaffolds, provide supports to hold piping, provide controls to prevent valves from closing, conduct annual confined space audits, ensure guard rails are adequate, and ensure that operating procedures are up-to-date and accurate. A serious violation is one in which there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should have known".
It is interesting to note that these violations have occurred even though PSM is mandatory.
Read the article in this link
January 4, 2011
Fire in oil storage depots in India
In the current year (2010-11) 4 instances of fires have been reported at oil depots in India:
A fire occurred at a railway siding due to spark from the overhead power line. Reason: Poor maintenance.
A fire incident took place at a Terminal's engineering store due to electrical short circuit.Reason: Poor maintenance.
Another incident took place in the cabin of TT at a Depot.Reason: Poor maintenance of TT and unsafe operating practices.
A fire broke out at a railway siding while loading.Reason: Unsafe practice and non-adherence to safety standards.The company has been advised by OISD to close the railway siding for all operations since it endangers the public life as it is close to the main Delhi-Kolkata railway track.
January 3, 2011
Risk factors in the Chemical Industry
1. Factory site
(1) vulnerable to earthquakes, floods, storms natural disasters
(2) water is not sufficient
(3) the lack of public Fire Facilities support
(4) high humidity, temperature and other climate change
(5) nearby hazardous impact of large industrial installations
(6) close to highways, railways, airports and other transportation facilities
(7) difficult to safely evacuate
2. Plant layout
(1) process equipment and storage equipment is too intensive
(2) have significant risk and risk-free process safety distance between devices is not enough
(3) expensive equipment too concentrated
(4) the absence of effective protection
(5) boiler, heaters and other sources of ignition too close
(6) with terrain obstacles
3. Structure
(1) supports, doors, walls and other structures are not fire proofed
(2) Electric Equipment without protective measures
(3) inadequate capacity of explosion-proof ventilation
(4) plant is weakened (corrosion)
4. The risk of lack of knowledge of processing material
(1) hazards of mixing raw materials and natural decomposition
(2) potential for gas and dust explosions
(3) not understanding the result of misuse, or poorly controlled process
5. Chemical Technology
(1) inadequate data on the chemical reaction kinetics
(2) lack of knowledgeof the dangerous side effects
(3) does not determine the decomposition energy according to thermodynamics
(4) detection of process abnormalities is not adequate.
6. Material handling
(1) incomplete labeling of products
(2) in adequate Explosion detection/suppression device
7. Maloperation
(1) ignoring maintenance
(2)lack of supervisory role of management
(3) driving and parking plan is inadequate
(4) the lack of emergency shutdown training
(5) not establishing collaboration between operation and security personnel
8. Device Defects
(1) caused by improper selection of equipment corrosion, damage
(2) inadequate equipment, such as the lack of reliable control instrumentation
(3) material fatigue
(4) the metal material is not adequate or no inspection by experts
(5) structural defects
(6) equipment operating above design limits
9. Disaster plan
(1) did not receive strong support from management
(2) the division of responsibilities is not clear
(3) no accident prevention program
Read the article in this link.
January 2, 2011
Ammonia gas cylinder burst
"All the tankers and cylinders containing gas were in use for a long time. They had not been changed despite many tankers and cylinders being outdated. There was also no fire prevention arrangement there," said S Dubey, a senior fire official of North Barrackpore".
I often see gas cylinders being transported in autorickshaws with the cylinder cap protruding out. Authorities must be trained on the dangers of gas cylinders and its handling and transport.
Read more in these links: Link 1, Link 2
Natural gas pipeline leak from cavern storage
The article mentions the following:
The following information is being relayed by Incident Command: As a safety precaution, we are still proceeding with the depressurization of the storage cavern as planned. The depressurization began about 3 p.m. Tuesday. We’re still venting gas to the atmosphere. This is a controlled process. The natural gas vented into the atmosphere will dissipate into the air and does not pose a health hazard to neighbors. Since 3 p.m. yesterday (Tuesday), we’ve vented about 400 million cubic feet. The flow rate is currently around 225 million cubic feet per day. We do not have an estimated timeline of how long the venting will take before the pressure in cavern 3 is zero.
Read my earlier post on gas cavern storage.
Now, I do not have the details of the leak but I was wondering why the whole cavern has to be vented.
Read the articles in these links: Article 1, Article 2
January 1, 2011
Incident Investigations in India - Aviation and Chemical
In the last two months, the DGCA has been trying to make the investigation process transparent. For the first time in India, investigation reports of two serious incidents were made public. The first one was the November 2009 Kingfisher Airlines ATR aircraft runway overrun accident at Mumbai airport.
However within days of making the reports public, the DGCA had to pull them off its website after several technical questions about the quality of the probe were raised by air safety experts. For instance, the DGCA investigation report called the Kingfisher Airlines case a "serious incident". Going by International Civil Aviation Organisation's definition though it was clearly an "accident
Currently, DGCA officials conduct probe into most of the accidents. "The same authority cannot be the prosecutor, investigator and the judge," said Zaidi, referring to the need to keep the DGCA away from probe into accidents".
It is high time that accidents in the chemical industry in India are also investigated by an independent agency.
December 27, 2010
Defense Less? The story of Deepwater Horizons last moments
An investigation by the New York Times graphically depicts the last moments of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.The article mentions the following:
"What emerges is a stark and singular fact: crew members died and suffered terrible injuries because every one of the Horizon’s defenses failed on April 20. Some were deployed but did not work. Some were activated too late, after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire or explosions. Some were never deployed at all.At critical moments that night, members of the crew hesitated and did not take the decisive steps needed. Communications fell apart, warning signs were missed and crew members in critical areas failed to coordinate a response.The result, the interviews and records show, was paralysis. For nine long minutes, as the drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the bridge, no warning was given to the rest of the crew. For many, the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast wave.
The paralysis had two main sources, the examination by The Times shows. The first was a failure to train for the worst. The Horizon was like a Gulf Coast town that regularly rehearsed for Category 1 hurricanes but never contemplated the hundred-year storm. The crew members, though expert in responding to the usual range of well problems, were unprepared for a major blowout followed by explosions, fires and a total loss of power.They were also frozen by the sheer complexity of the Horizon’s defenses, and by the policies that explained when they were to be deployed. One emergency system alone was controlled by 30 buttons".
"The industry has long depicted blowout preventers as “the ultimate fail-safe.” But Transocean says the Horizon’s blowout preventer was simply incapable of preventing this blowout. Evidence is mounting, however, that the blowout preventer may have been crippled by poor maintenance. Investigators have found a host of problems — dead batteries, bad solenoid valves, leaking hydraulic lines — that were overlooked or ignored. Transocean had also never performed an expensive 90-day maintenance inspection that the manufacturer said should be done every three to five years. Industry standards and federal regulations said the same thing. BP and a Transocean safety consultant had pointed out that the Horizon’s blowout preventer, a decade old, was past due for the inspection.
Transocean decided that its regular maintenance program was adequate for the time being."
Read the full article in this link.
December 24, 2010
Static charge + Flammable dust = EXPLOSION
Mumbai Port Chlorine gas leak - recommendations
Maintain your fire water systems. You never know when they will be needed.
Read the PIB press release in this link.
December 23, 2010
US Unions view of oil industry safety
"After the 2005 Texas City blast" which killed at least 15 people at BP's USW-represented Texas City, Texas refinery, "We got a federal grant to develop a process safety curriculum," he explained. "It was approved by OSHA and we offered it, for free, to the companies," where USW would train workers in safety, "if they would just pay the salaries of workers to come to it" for 3-day sessions, he added. They turned it down.
The industry's attitude extends down to the local level, the two Alaskans said. At Prudhoe Bay, until local management changed last year, bonuses depended on how few accidents managers reported. Health and safety data was "manipulated" and workers did not report accidents "for fear of being disciplined," Trimmer, Local 4959's secretary-treasurer, said. BP has "a safety matrix" for each pipeline work area, with standards set for how few accidents are allowed. Report more, the 30-year veteran said, and supervisors lose bonuses.
"One guy had a bad vehicle accident. He had a broken leg and didn't report if for three hours. When he finally had to and we asked him why he delayed, he responded that he feared being fired," Trimmer said. Overtime and fatigue are also problems: 18-hour days for 2-week stretches are technically banned, so workers toil 16 hours. Guenther, a 25-year chief steward at Prudhoe, said that from 1979 to 1994, management emphasized preventive maintenance on the pipeline, but things have gone downhill since. Workers left and were not replaced, while the oil field he worked at doubled in size. Only recently has new hiring exceeded retirements, Guenther added.
"We went from preventive maintenance to running around fixing problems at all hours of the day and night," even in Alaska's sub-zero cold, Guenther said. Problems pile up and are shoved into "a backlog." Structures at the pipeline are reaching the end of their useful working lives, 15-25 years old, developing cracks that are patched. And BP rejected the local's contract proposal for a full-time health and safety specialist.
"We have to fundamentally change how we regulate this industry - and there's an even wider gap between regulation and the industry" than elsewhere, Wright told the CSB. "What we need are effective management programs, with strong regulation, backed by strong unionization and strong worker involvement" in safety"
Read the article in this link