Be careful when you deal with automated systems

With many valves being able to be operated from control room and also automated, this raises a hazard when carrying out maintenance. These automated valves should not open suddenly when maintenance work is going on. Do you have clear procedures to correctly Lock Out Tag Out and Try out such systems?

Read this incident:

At 9:00 a.m. on May 23, 2023, Employee #1 and Employee #2, both maintenance workers for a petroleum refinery were troubleshooting an automated valve in the "Prime G Unit". Flammable gasoline/hydrocarbons in the piping and flange portion of the automated valve were released causing an explosion and fire. Employee #1 sustained 3rd degree burns to over 83% of his body and was hospitalized. Employee #2 sustained 3rd degree burns to over 93% of his body and died on May 26, 2023. 

Source OSHA.gov

Catastrophic Explosion in CO2 Removal Unit of an Ammonia Plant

Good case study for those operating ammonia plants 

 https://www.researchgate.net/figure/The-view-of-the-incident-position-32-inch-semi-lean-amine-pipe-to-absorption-tower_fig3_315832742

Two employees are killed in explosion

 At 6:45 p.m. on September 20, 2022, the south area units of the refinery were experiencing process upset conditions, including lifting pressure safety valves and loss of pump arounds on the crude tower. Due to an incident earlier in the day, the NT/Sat gas unit and Coker gas plant were not in normal operating conditions. During work to troubleshoot and provide stability to the process units, the opening of a flow control valve to the absorber stripper tower in the Coker gas plant resulted in naphtha to flow downstream, eventually filling the TIU fuel gas mix drum with naphtha. This led to liquid in the refinery fuel gas system, which initiated the shutting down of some operating units. During outside employee response to the high liquid level in the TIU fuel gas mix drum, naphtha was released into the atmosphere, forming a flammable vapor cloud at ground level and in the oily water sewer at the refinery. At approximately 6:47 pm, the vapor cloud ignited at/near the TIU fuel gas mix drum, possibly due to nearby fired heaters, in the crude unit. Both of the outside employees who responded to the high liquid levels were severely burned in the explosion. Both of the employees died due to their burn injuries in the early morning of September 21, 2022. 

Source:OSHA.gov

Employee suffers burns and fracture in explosion at refinery

 An employee was working for a contractor that supported gas and oil operations. On or before December 21, 2021, a leak was found on a flange for a bypass line on the Hydro Desulfurization Unit (HDU-1) at refinery operated by an international oil company. The leak was detected because the leak had auto ignited. The refinery owner's fire team had been called out to put the fire out. After the fire was out, steam lances were continuously directed on the flange due to the potential of another flash fire from the leaking heated naphtha. The refinery's owner hired two contract companies to repair the leaking flange using a method called hot bolting. In this method, one bolt at a time was removed and replaced so that workers could install a wire wrap and seal the leak. The replacement bolts were longer and had injection collars. Workers would do the wire wrap and inject the bolts with a sealant to stop the leak. At 1:00 a.m. on December 23, 2021, an employee was working for the contracting firm that would remove and replace the bolts, while the other contractor assisted. As the employee was waiting for the other contractor, an explosion occurred during the repair. The employee suffered second-degree burns. In addition, he suffered a fractured femur when he was struck by a flying object from the explosion. He was hospitalized. Another worker there was not hospitalized. The employee's supervisors knew that the flange had auto ignited the day before they were called to come and fix the leak. The supervisors did not, though, ensure that employees had upgraded their personal protective equipment (PPE) to reduce the risk of serious injuries should a flash fire reoccur. They did not evaluate the hazards and select and require the use of appropriate PPE using their knowledge of the operating conditions, nor did they use refinery owner's safe work practice requirement of using upgraded PPE when work activity is going to be done in areas with potential flash fire. 

Source:OSHA.gov