Confined space fatality

Confined space fatality – Sharp LadyThe Isle of Man Ship Registry has published Casualty Investigation Report No. CA118 on a confined space entry fatality that occurred on a crude tanker. The incident occurred after discharging crude oil. Equipment was lost at the bottom of a tank. It was decided that once the discharge was finished and crude oil washing completed, the equipment should be retrieved before loading the next cargo into this tank, to avoid any potential damage to the ship’s equipment.

The Chief Officer and Cadet entered the cargo tank after an enclosed space work permit and risk assessment had been completed. When the Chief Officer and Cadet reached the bottom of the cargo tank they felt debilitating effects of hydrocarbon vapour present at the lower level of the cargo tank. Both the Chief Officer and Cadet attempted to activate their Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBD) and exit the cargo tank.
The Master observed the Cadet in difficulty and quickly entered the tank, ignoring the advice of a fellow crew member. The Chief Officer successfully exited the cargo tank but the Cadet had collapsed unconscious on the tank bottom. When the Master reached the tank bottom to aid the Cadet he was overcome by hydrocarbon vapour and collapsed.
The alarm was raised and a rescue was quickly initiated. The Master and Cadet were retrieved from the bottom of the cargo tank and brought to the main deck where first aid was administered. The report concludes that the Master died and the Cadet was injured as a result of entering the cargo tank containing a concentration of hydrocarbon vapour at the bottom of the cargo tank. The ship’s safety procedures for enclosed space were not fully complied with and the risk posed by the hydrocarbon vapour measured in the cargo tank was not appreciated by those involved in the tank entry preparations.
The report also concludes that opportunities were missed on board to stop the tank entry by several crew members and that the death of the Master could have been prevented had the safety procedures on board been followed in full.
The full report can be found at gov.im/lib/docs/ded/shipregistry/formsdocs/reports/casualty/iompg12.pdf

Source:IMCA

https:/Stored energy-injury caused by failure of expansion joint

https://www.imca-int.com/alert/1393/stored-energy-injury-caused-by-failure-of-expansion-joint-in-fire-fighting-equipment/

Cross sensitivity of detectors

During an examination of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier whose cargo tanks contained ethylene vapors, CO (Carbon Monoxide) gas alarms were received which were traced to an eight-inch crack on a cargo vapor line.
It was noted that the molecular weight of Ethylene (28 g/mol) was identical to the molecular weight of CO, which accounted for the CO PPM readings.  Coast Guard personnel contacted the manufacturer who confirmed that gases such as methane, propane, ethylene and mercaptan, could actuate the CO sensor without ever coming into the range of the LEL limits.

As a result of these events the Coast Guard “strongly reminds all surveyors, marine inspectors, port state control examiners, and any other persons utilizing portable gas monitors and detectors while working onboard on Liquefied Gas Carriers to remain acutely aware that the ethylene gas vapors can exhibit cross-sensitivity.  This issue is not limited to the monitors that the Coast Guard uses but also those made by other manufacturers.  Everyone using a monitor must be aware that if the CO alarm goes off it may be an indication of dangerous gases or chemical vapors and not the presence of CO.  When the alarm sounds users must take corrective action to minimize exposure risks.”
Courtesy: USCG

New IEC 61511

https://www.chemicalprocessing.com/articles/2018/does-your-existing-sis-get-the-job-done/?show=all

Avoid Safety Pitfalls During Plant Expansion and Modification

Avoid Safety Pitfalls During Plant Expansion and Modification

Chemical Disaster Rule

https://earthjustice.org/features/toxic-catastrophes-texas-national-chemical-disaster-rule

Level gauge and Bromine Transportation incident

Mixed acid charging in the reactor was in progress. Level gauge of mixed acid measuring vessel broke and mixed acid splashed on the body of two employees, injuring them seriously. Root Causes: Inadequate preventive maintenance, Employees not aware about potential hazard involved in the operation.

Transportation of Bromine carried out in glass bottle having 3 Kgs capacity in wooden box by goods vehicle. During transportation few bottles broken & started leaking. Due to leakage near by area affected with bromine gas. People around the area were affected due to inhalation. Root Causes: Inadequate packing of bromine bottle. Untrained driver.

Courtesy: A.G.Shingore, National Safety Council

Cut your losses with relief valve monitoring by Emerson Process Management

http://www2.emersonprocess.com/siteadmincenter/PM%20Articles/P28-29%20Inside%20Process.pdf

Incident due to reverse rotation

https://www.turbomachinerymag.com/damage-from-reverse-rotation-of-compressor-during-shutdown/

Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC)

Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC): An unplanned or uncontrolled release of material from primary containment, including non-toxic and non-flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed air).


Source: CCPS Glossary

Ammonia leak during ship unloading

https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/wa/emergency-crews-respond-to-incident-at-kwinana-beach-ng-b88903554z

Maximum ‘return on audit’ depends on zero loss of containment

Maximum ‘return on audit’ depends on zero loss of containment

Controlling corrosion

Controlling corrosion: Roland Anderson, Executive VP at Cosasco, warns not to conflate cause and effect.

safetydifferently.com : Oil and gas safety in a post truth world

Excellent article!
http://www.safetydifferently.com/oil-and-gas-safety-in-a-post-truth-world/

Lessons learnt from a refinery fire

1. A fire started while draining naphtha from a pipeline that ran through a pump house at the refinery.
2. Investigations revealed that there were three main lapses that led to the fire:
   
   (a) The refinery had allowed its contractors to drain naphtha from the pipeline by allowing the naphtha to flow out from two open valves and an open flange joint of the pipeline into trays. This open system of de-oiling allowed naphtha vapour to escape into the atmosphere resulting in an accumulation of flammable vapour, which would in turn pose a danger of ignition.
   
   (b) The refinery had allowed the use of a plastic tray, which was a non-conductive container, as a receptacle for collection of naphtha. The free fall of naphtha onto the plastic tray would allow accumulation of static charges as a result of the friction caused between them. When the accumulated static charges come into contact with any good conductor, they are instantaneously transferred to the conductor. A spark could be caused as a result of the sudden surge of energy during the transfer, which could be sufficient to ignite the naphtha vapour which is within flammable range in the atmosphere.
   
   (c) The refinery failed to deploy portable gas monitors sufficiently close to the open de-oiling area to give the warning when the build-up of the flammable vapour reached an undesirable level. 

Source: Ministry of Manpower, Singapore

First responders practice with large-scale simulation

First responders practice with large-scale simulation: FRANKLIN CO. -- First responders from across southern Illinois were running drills to prepare for emergency situations that could occur in our communities.  Dozens of fire trucks, ambulances, and ...

Work permit incidents

1. Installation of new Sulfuric acid tank was going on. Two employees were welding on top of the tank. Suddenly the neighboring acid tank exploded. Two persons died. Root Causes were nascent hydrogen caught fire and Hot work was going one very near to acid filled tank.
2. Two workers were doing maintenance work inside the kettle. Personnel from production started charging CO in the same kettle, assuming that it is empty & ready for charging next batch. Due to inhalation of carbon monoxide two workers died in the kettle.Root causes: Ineffectiveness of work permit system .

Courtesy: A.G.Shingore, National Safety Council

A reliable plant is good for safety

https://reliabilityweb.com/articles/entry/a_reliable_plant_good_for_personal_and_process_safety

Integrity Manuals: The Most Significant Factor in Avoiding Asset Failure

Integrity Manuals: The Most Significant Factor in Avoiding Asset Failure: This special report, authored by Richard Fish, Asset Integrity Specialist, demonstrates the importance of integrity manuals when it comes to combating asset corrosion.

No excuse for cutting corners on corrosion in downstream plants

No excuse for cutting corners on corrosion in downstream plants: The risks to safety and revenue associated with corrosion in refineries and petrochemical plants are too high to ignore. Phil Yule, Cosasco, explains.