January 7, 2011
One killed in explosion in chlorine plant
January 6, 2011
Major fire in depot near Rotterdam
Refinery cited for multiple safety hazards
"The serious violations include failing to provide properly constructed scaffolds, provide supports to hold piping, provide controls to prevent valves from closing, conduct annual confined space audits, ensure guard rails are adequate, and ensure that operating procedures are up-to-date and accurate. A serious violation is one in which there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should have known".
It is interesting to note that these violations have occurred even though PSM is mandatory.
Read the article in this link
January 4, 2011
Fire in oil storage depots in India
In the current year (2010-11) 4 instances of fires have been reported at oil depots in India:
A fire occurred at a railway siding due to spark from the overhead power line. Reason: Poor maintenance.
A fire incident took place at a Terminal's engineering store due to electrical short circuit.Reason: Poor maintenance.
Another incident took place in the cabin of TT at a Depot.Reason: Poor maintenance of TT and unsafe operating practices.
A fire broke out at a railway siding while loading.Reason: Unsafe practice and non-adherence to safety standards.The company has been advised by OISD to close the railway siding for all operations since it endangers the public life as it is close to the main Delhi-Kolkata railway track.
January 3, 2011
Risk factors in the Chemical Industry
1. Factory site
(1) vulnerable to earthquakes, floods, storms natural disasters
(2) water is not sufficient
(3) the lack of public Fire Facilities support
(4) high humidity, temperature and other climate change
(5) nearby hazardous impact of large industrial installations
(6) close to highways, railways, airports and other transportation facilities
(7) difficult to safely evacuate
2. Plant layout
(1) process equipment and storage equipment is too intensive
(2) have significant risk and risk-free process safety distance between devices is not enough
(3) expensive equipment too concentrated
(4) the absence of effective protection
(5) boiler, heaters and other sources of ignition too close
(6) with terrain obstacles
3. Structure
(1) supports, doors, walls and other structures are not fire proofed
(2) Electric Equipment without protective measures
(3) inadequate capacity of explosion-proof ventilation
(4) plant is weakened (corrosion)
4. The risk of lack of knowledge of processing material
(1) hazards of mixing raw materials and natural decomposition
(2) potential for gas and dust explosions
(3) not understanding the result of misuse, or poorly controlled process
5. Chemical Technology
(1) inadequate data on the chemical reaction kinetics
(2) lack of knowledgeof the dangerous side effects
(3) does not determine the decomposition energy according to thermodynamics
(4) detection of process abnormalities is not adequate.
6. Material handling
(1) incomplete labeling of products
(2) in adequate Explosion detection/suppression device
7. Maloperation
(1) ignoring maintenance
(2)lack of supervisory role of management
(3) driving and parking plan is inadequate
(4) the lack of emergency shutdown training
(5) not establishing collaboration between operation and security personnel
8. Device Defects
(1) caused by improper selection of equipment corrosion, damage
(2) inadequate equipment, such as the lack of reliable control instrumentation
(3) material fatigue
(4) the metal material is not adequate or no inspection by experts
(5) structural defects
(6) equipment operating above design limits
9. Disaster plan
(1) did not receive strong support from management
(2) the division of responsibilities is not clear
(3) no accident prevention program
Read the article in this link.
January 2, 2011
Ammonia gas cylinder burst
"All the tankers and cylinders containing gas were in use for a long time. They had not been changed despite many tankers and cylinders being outdated. There was also no fire prevention arrangement there," said S Dubey, a senior fire official of North Barrackpore".
I often see gas cylinders being transported in autorickshaws with the cylinder cap protruding out. Authorities must be trained on the dangers of gas cylinders and its handling and transport.
Read more in these links: Link 1, Link 2
Natural gas pipeline leak from cavern storage
The article mentions the following:
The following information is being relayed by Incident Command: As a safety precaution, we are still proceeding with the depressurization of the storage cavern as planned. The depressurization began about 3 p.m. Tuesday. We’re still venting gas to the atmosphere. This is a controlled process. The natural gas vented into the atmosphere will dissipate into the air and does not pose a health hazard to neighbors. Since 3 p.m. yesterday (Tuesday), we’ve vented about 400 million cubic feet. The flow rate is currently around 225 million cubic feet per day. We do not have an estimated timeline of how long the venting will take before the pressure in cavern 3 is zero.
Read my earlier post on gas cavern storage.
Now, I do not have the details of the leak but I was wondering why the whole cavern has to be vented.
Read the articles in these links: Article 1, Article 2
January 1, 2011
Incident Investigations in India - Aviation and Chemical
In the last two months, the DGCA has been trying to make the investigation process transparent. For the first time in India, investigation reports of two serious incidents were made public. The first one was the November 2009 Kingfisher Airlines ATR aircraft runway overrun accident at Mumbai airport.
However within days of making the reports public, the DGCA had to pull them off its website after several technical questions about the quality of the probe were raised by air safety experts. For instance, the DGCA investigation report called the Kingfisher Airlines case a "serious incident". Going by International Civil Aviation Organisation's definition though it was clearly an "accident
Currently, DGCA officials conduct probe into most of the accidents. "The same authority cannot be the prosecutor, investigator and the judge," said Zaidi, referring to the need to keep the DGCA away from probe into accidents".
It is high time that accidents in the chemical industry in India are also investigated by an independent agency.
December 27, 2010
Defense Less? The story of Deepwater Horizons last moments
An investigation by the New York Times graphically depicts the last moments of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.The article mentions the following:
"What emerges is a stark and singular fact: crew members died and suffered terrible injuries because every one of the Horizon’s defenses failed on April 20. Some were deployed but did not work. Some were activated too late, after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire or explosions. Some were never deployed at all.At critical moments that night, members of the crew hesitated and did not take the decisive steps needed. Communications fell apart, warning signs were missed and crew members in critical areas failed to coordinate a response.The result, the interviews and records show, was paralysis. For nine long minutes, as the drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the bridge, no warning was given to the rest of the crew. For many, the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast wave.
The paralysis had two main sources, the examination by The Times shows. The first was a failure to train for the worst. The Horizon was like a Gulf Coast town that regularly rehearsed for Category 1 hurricanes but never contemplated the hundred-year storm. The crew members, though expert in responding to the usual range of well problems, were unprepared for a major blowout followed by explosions, fires and a total loss of power.They were also frozen by the sheer complexity of the Horizon’s defenses, and by the policies that explained when they were to be deployed. One emergency system alone was controlled by 30 buttons".
"The industry has long depicted blowout preventers as “the ultimate fail-safe.” But Transocean says the Horizon’s blowout preventer was simply incapable of preventing this blowout. Evidence is mounting, however, that the blowout preventer may have been crippled by poor maintenance. Investigators have found a host of problems — dead batteries, bad solenoid valves, leaking hydraulic lines — that were overlooked or ignored. Transocean had also never performed an expensive 90-day maintenance inspection that the manufacturer said should be done every three to five years. Industry standards and federal regulations said the same thing. BP and a Transocean safety consultant had pointed out that the Horizon’s blowout preventer, a decade old, was past due for the inspection.
Transocean decided that its regular maintenance program was adequate for the time being."
Read the full article in this link.
December 24, 2010
Static charge + Flammable dust = EXPLOSION
Mumbai Port Chlorine gas leak - recommendations
Maintain your fire water systems. You never know when they will be needed.
Read the PIB press release in this link.
December 23, 2010
US Unions view of oil industry safety
"After the 2005 Texas City blast" which killed at least 15 people at BP's USW-represented Texas City, Texas refinery, "We got a federal grant to develop a process safety curriculum," he explained. "It was approved by OSHA and we offered it, for free, to the companies," where USW would train workers in safety, "if they would just pay the salaries of workers to come to it" for 3-day sessions, he added. They turned it down.
The industry's attitude extends down to the local level, the two Alaskans said. At Prudhoe Bay, until local management changed last year, bonuses depended on how few accidents managers reported. Health and safety data was "manipulated" and workers did not report accidents "for fear of being disciplined," Trimmer, Local 4959's secretary-treasurer, said. BP has "a safety matrix" for each pipeline work area, with standards set for how few accidents are allowed. Report more, the 30-year veteran said, and supervisors lose bonuses.
"One guy had a bad vehicle accident. He had a broken leg and didn't report if for three hours. When he finally had to and we asked him why he delayed, he responded that he feared being fired," Trimmer said. Overtime and fatigue are also problems: 18-hour days for 2-week stretches are technically banned, so workers toil 16 hours. Guenther, a 25-year chief steward at Prudhoe, said that from 1979 to 1994, management emphasized preventive maintenance on the pipeline, but things have gone downhill since. Workers left and were not replaced, while the oil field he worked at doubled in size. Only recently has new hiring exceeded retirements, Guenther added.
"We went from preventive maintenance to running around fixing problems at all hours of the day and night," even in Alaska's sub-zero cold, Guenther said. Problems pile up and are shoved into "a backlog." Structures at the pipeline are reaching the end of their useful working lives, 15-25 years old, developing cracks that are patched. And BP rejected the local's contract proposal for a full-time health and safety specialist.
"We have to fundamentally change how we regulate this industry - and there's an even wider gap between regulation and the industry" than elsewhere, Wright told the CSB. "What we need are effective management programs, with strong regulation, backed by strong unionization and strong worker involvement" in safety"
Read the article in this link
December 22, 2010
Two killed after inhaling nitrogen gas
Read more about the incident in this link.
Read an updated news article in this link
December 21, 2010
Pipeline explosion -"Rivers of Fire"
Read the news article about the incident with video in this link.
For an article about India's petroleum and gas pipeline network, read it in this link.
December 20, 2010
Safety valves and their importance
Read about the incident in this link.
December 17, 2010
Behind every major incident is one or more near misses!
Behind every major incidents there are a number of warnings! Read the full article in this link.
Dust explosions
"1.Properly assess your dust's fire and explosion characteristics so adequate measures can be taken for the prevention and mitigation of hazards in your own facilities and, if you are shipping the dust to some other facilities, at those locations.
2. Understand your own powder handling and processing operations. You should be able to identify likely ignition sources during both normal and abnormal operating conditions. Also pinpoint location(s) where combustible dust clouds could exist during normal and abnormal operating conditions.
3. Take effective measures to avoid or control ignition sources and formation of combustible dust clouds. Also consider explosion protection (such as venting and suppression) and isolation to lower the risk to a tolerable level.
4. Maintain dust explosion prevention and mitigation measures".
Read the full article in this link.
Another article about the ongoing investigation on the explosion in the AL solutions plant in by the CSB mentions that the CSB is also looking at the possibility of explosion of zirconium dust......read the article in this link.
December 15, 2010
Welding procedures and pipelines
Read the full article in this link.
December 14, 2010
Facility siting - different countries, different approaches
Now, In India, the main problem is lack of will in enforcing the existing laws. Many chemical plants come up in isolated areas but after some years, residences spring up around the plant, with the authorities knowing about it. The IOC Jaipur oil depot where a major fire occurred, is an example.
When will we ever learn? Read the article in this link.