HAPPY NEW YEAR!

WISHING ALL MY READERS A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR 2011!

Defense Less? The story of Deepwater Horizons last moments

An investigation by the New York Times graphically depicts the last moments of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig.The article mentions the following:

"What emerges is a stark and singular fact: crew members died and suffered terrible injuries because every one of the Horizon’s defenses failed on April 20. Some were deployed but did not work. Some were activated too late, after they had almost certainly been damaged by fire or explosions. Some were never deployed at all.At critical moments that night, members of the crew hesitated and did not take the decisive steps needed. Communications fell apart, warning signs were missed and crew members in critical areas failed to coordinate a response.The result, the interviews and records show, was paralysis. For nine long minutes, as the drilling crew battled the blowout and gas alarms eventually sounded on the bridge, no warning was given to the rest of the crew. For many, the first hint of crisis came in the form of a blast wave.

The paralysis had two main sources, the examination by The Times shows. The first was a failure to train for the worst. The Horizon was like a Gulf Coast town that regularly rehearsed for Category 1 hurricanes but never contemplated the hundred-year storm. The crew members, though expert in responding to the usual range of well problems, were unprepared for a major blowout followed by explosions, fires and a total loss of power.They were also frozen by the sheer complexity of the Horizon’s defenses, and by the policies that explained when they were to be deployed. One emergency system alone was controlled by 30 buttons".

"The industry has long depicted blowout preventers as “the ultimate fail-safe.” But Transocean says the Horizon’s blowout preventer was simply incapable of preventing this blowout. Evidence is mounting, however, that the blowout preventer may have been crippled by poor maintenance. Investigators have found a host of problems — dead batteries, bad solenoid valves, leaking hydraulic lines — that were overlooked or ignored. Transocean had also never performed an expensive 90-day maintenance inspection that the manufacturer said should be done every three to five years. Industry standards and federal regulations said the same thing. BP and a Transocean safety consultant had pointed out that the Horizon’s blowout preventer, a decade old, was past due for the inspection.

Transocean decided that its regular maintenance program was adequate for the time being."

Read the full article in this link.

Static charge + Flammable dust = EXPLOSION

A news article mentions that OSHA is investigating an explosion that occurred on Thursday morning,caused by static charge and flammable dust at a facility in the US.

"Six employees were working, but none were near the eruption, said Trumbauersville Fire Chief Josh Mallery.“They were very lucky,” said Mallery, whose company led the blaze battling effort. The explosion blew an interior wall eight inches back off the foundation and sparked spot fires in the walls, said Rafferty. A corrugated roll up door was blown out, its bottom half ripped off and flung about 30 feet. A portion of the plant’s exterior wall bellied out, and a heap of cinderblocks from the structure tumbled on the ground outside the plant.“It was amazing. I’ve been a firefighter for 15 years and I’ve never seen anything like it,” said Mallery.

Fearing more explosions, firefighters first directed their hoses at about 1,200 pounds of Polyclar10, the powdered substance that was at the root of the explosion. In a wetted, condensed form, the powder does not pose the explosive threat it does when airborne as fine, particulate dust, said Mallery.

Firefighters then concentrated on extinguishing the flames. “It was about 2 ½ hours before we had the situation stabilized,” said Mallery.The explosion happened while the Polycar10 was being packaged. The packaging equipment was grounded to prevent static charges that could combust the compound, but a bag the powder was being deposited into was not grounded, said Rafferty. As the powder moved across the plastic interior of the bag, a static charge was generated, providing the heat source that ignited the powder, which is used to clarify beer before bottling, the fire marshal said".

Read the full article in this link

Mumbai Port Chlorine gas leak - recommendations

The PIB has published the recommendations of the expert committee set up to probe the chlorine gas leak from old cylinders I had mentioned in my earlier post. One of the recommendations states "The Head of Civil and Mechanical Engineering Department of MbPT should take immediate action to repair the fire hydrant system and ensure that the fire hydrant system is in working condition. This activity shall be completed by 31^st, December, 2010".
Maintain your fire water systems. You never know when they will be needed.
Read the PIB press release in this link.

US Unions view of oil industry safety

An union in the US has told the CSB which is currently investigating the BP oil rig disaster about the following issues regarding safety:

"After the 2005 Texas City blast" which killed at least 15 people at BP's USW-represented Texas City, Texas refinery, "We got a federal grant to develop a process safety curriculum," he explained. "It was approved by OSHA and we offered it, for free, to the companies," where USW would train workers in safety, "if they would just pay the salaries of workers to come to it" for 3-day sessions, he added. They turned it down.

The industry's attitude extends down to the local level, the two Alaskans said. At Prudhoe Bay, until local management changed last year, bonuses depended on how few accidents managers reported. Health and safety data was "manipulated" and workers did not report accidents "for fear of being disciplined," Trimmer, Local 4959's secretary-treasurer, said. BP has "a safety matrix" for each pipeline work area, with standards set for how few accidents are allowed. Report more, the 30-year veteran said, and supervisors lose bonuses.

"One guy had a bad vehicle accident. He had a broken leg and didn't report if for three hours. When he finally had to and we asked him why he delayed, he responded that he feared being fired," Trimmer said. Overtime and fatigue are also problems: 18-hour days for 2-week stretches are technically banned, so workers toil 16 hours. Guenther, a 25-year chief steward at Prudhoe, said that from 1979 to 1994, management emphasized preventive maintenance on the pipeline, but things have gone downhill since. Workers left and were not replaced, while the oil field he worked at doubled in size. Only recently has new hiring exceeded retirements, Guenther added.

"We went from preventive maintenance to running around fixing problems at all hours of the day and night," even in Alaska's sub-zero cold, Guenther said. Problems pile up and are shoved into "a backlog." Structures at the pipeline are reaching the end of their useful working lives, 15-25 years old, developing cracks that are patched. And BP rejected the local's contract proposal for a full-time health and safety specialist.

"We have to fundamentally change how we regulate this industry - and there's an even wider gap between regulation and the industry" than elsewhere, Wright told the CSB. "What we need are effective management programs, with strong regulation, backed by strong unionization and strong worker involvement" in safety"

Read the article in this link