Remembering Bhopal............

Please spend December 2nd/3rd as “Process Safety Day” in your organisation. Educate your personnel on the Bhopal Gas tragedy and its lessons. 27 years ago, on the night on December 2nd/3rd, 1984, on a wintry night in Bhopal, thousands of men, women and children died an excruciating death when MIC leaked from the Union Carbide factory. The survivors and the next generation children born to those exposed to the gas still are suffering from the effects of the gas. Bhopal is an ongoing tragedy and should never be forgotten. The Bhopal gas disaster comprises actually of three disasters - the first was the actual incident, the second was the inadequate compensation received and the third is the ongoing legacy of genetic defects and effects of the hazardous waste that has seeped into the ground water. Every plant operating, maintenance and safety personnel must never forget the lessons of Bhopal. They are still relevant today:
1. Do not cut costs without looking at the effects on process safety
2. Maintain all your layers of defense including asset integrity
3. Continually ensure that competency of personnel operating and maintaining plants are updated and current
4. Be prepared for the worst case scenario.
5. Understand the risks and measures to eliminate / reduce or control them
6. Learn from your past incidents. Those who do not learn are condemned to repeat the incidents.
7. Pay heed to your process safety management system audit reports

As you are aware, this blog is also dedicated to the surviving victims of Bhopal and for my regular subscribers, I appeal to you to buy my book "Practical Process Safety Management", the proceeds from which are donated to the surviving victims of Bhopal.Contact me at bkprism@gmail.com for buying the book.

See a presentation on the Bhopal Gas Tragedy by Vijita S Aggarwal, Associate Professor, University School of Management Studies,GGS Indraprastha University,Delhi, India in this link.
Read my older post comparing the Bhopal and the BP incident of 2005 in this link
Read the then Police Chief’s account of the tragedy in this link.

Generation next and Process Safety

I had given a presentation on Process safety management  to the Ankleshwar Chapter of Indian Institute of Chemical Engineers recently. A large number of young engineers were present. The chapter is doing good work by exposing the young engineers to the concepts of process safety management. In the audience, there were also young mechanical engineers who were working in chemical plants. We can prevent another Bhopal only by passing on the lessons learnt from Bhopal to the younger generation. The memories of Bhopal should not die with this generation but must always be kept fresh. Read my earlier post on the "Lessons from Bhopal - more so relevant today"

The legacy of Bhopal

The Bhopal gas disaster comprises actually of three disasters - the first was the actual incident, the second was the inadequate compensation received and the third is the ongoing legacy of genetic defects and effects of the hazardous waste that has seeped into the ground water.Every plant operating and maintenance personnel must never forget the lessons of Bhopal. They are still relevant today. Read an article about the toxic wastes in this link.

Aviation safety and Chemical Process Safety- Different approaches!

I was reading a press release by the Press Information Bureau about the improvements made by the civil aviation minsitry one year after the fatal Mangalore air crash. The report mentions the following:
"A Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council (CASAC) was formed on May 28, 2010 with the mandate to strengthen aviation safety environment through synergisation of available expertise in areas of airlines, airworthiness, operations, air navigation, aerodromes, aircraft engineering, human performance. Special invitees to the Council include FAA, ICAO Experts, IATA, Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier etc. This is an ongoing initiative under the Chairmanship of Secretary (Civil Aviation). The Council gets its technical inputs from working groups covering Operations (Fixed wing and helicopter sub-Groups), Aerodromes, Air Navigation Services, Airworthiness General Aviation and Helicopters. Based on the reassurance drive several issues in the three areas of aerodromes, operations and airworthiness came up. Immediate actions to address the deficiencies have been taken up during the past one year. Several safety related circulars have been issued and implementation ensured. These include presence of Cabin crew in cockpit in case of one pilot leaving the cockpit, Cabin Crew to interact with pilots on intercom during period of lean cockpit activity, in the event of incapacitation of PIC, copilot to take over control and in the event of PIC not responding to calls of copilot regarding ‘go around’, assertiveness by copilot to be encouraged. Regulatory provision for penal action for reporting for duty with alcohol consumption has been made. Pilots are being subjected to Breath Analyser test prior to flights. License are being suspended for three months in case of first BA positive and on second BA positive instance, the licence is cancelled.
In a move to step up the quality of training Captains, the period of Instructorship/ Examiner-ship has been restricted to 5 years with proficiency check every 2 years. Increased oversight for selection of trainers, quality of training imparted by trainers, integrity of simulator training have been introduced. Breath Analyser Test has been mandated for approval of Training Captains and Pilots with BA ‘positive’ report have been debarred from becoming Training Captains. Existing Training Captains if found BA ‘positive’ are debarred from training Captain list for three years.The process for approval of foreign pilots has been made stringent wherein background checks are being done to ensure that these pilots have accident free record. The experience requirements for the foreign pilots have been enhanced and the pilots are subjected to Proficiency Checks before approval is granted by DGCA. These pilots are being subjected to same medical standards as the Indian pilots."  Read the press release in this link
While appreciating the efforts taken by the Government in improving air safety, I could not help comparing the status of process safety management in India after the Bhopal disaster, when compared to developed nations. The PSM rule which is mandatory in USA since 1992 is still not mandatory in India......

Bhopal disaster - Police Chief's account

I met Mr Swaraj Puri, the then Chief of Bhopal Police when the Bhopal gas disaster occured, at an international conference on Bhopal gas disaster at IIT Kanpur in 2004. He recounted the horrors of that night and the difficulty he and his men faced in the aftermath of the tragedy. I chanced upon his website where he mentions all the details of that fateful night in December 1984.He mentions the following:

"The Shortcoming and the Lessons for the future
One of the first thing that struck us when the gas leak took place was our total lack of preparedness and ignorance about how to deal with such a situation.
The medical fraternity and the chemists were unaware about the effects of Methyl Isocynate on humans and also the medical treatment to deal with cases of exposure. The Chief Medical Officer of the Union Carbide Factory initially deemed MIC as only an irritant! Since the gas was of the cyanide family, Sodium Thiosulphite was administered as a probable antidote. Specifically the factory was to blame because:

• The plant did not give vital information about the storage and handling of hazardous and dangerous materials.
• Effect of MIC on humans and the antidotal treatment was not known to the medical fraternity and such knowledge if available was not disseminated to the emergency services.
• There was a lack of appreciation of disaster management within the Government and also inadequate co-ordination between the factory and the emergency services.
• There was an absence of proper warning system in the plant. No practice drills were ever held.
• Union Carbide itself had limited data on MIC and probably had never anticipated the 'worst case scenario
• Poor plant maintenance practices. Inventory of vital spares had been depleted.
• Exodus of some of the experienced engineers and operating personnel from the plant.
• Economy measures, overriding safety concerns.

Apart from these, we noticed some other difficulties all inextricably linked up with the developmental process in the country.

• Densely populated areas around the plant. Often shanties / slums come up on vacant areas surrounding the factories greatly increasing the danger of loss to human life. Urban planning authorities are powerless, there is an absence of political will since much of the problem is caused by the poor flocking to the cities in search of employment.
• Absence of a proper road network, rescue workers had to move on foot through densely populated areas
• Poor communications, though things have improved now.
• Lack of effective emergency medical facilities.
• Inadequate transport for emergency evacuation, even today the infrastructure is woefully in adequate.
• Cattle living in residential areas, a peculiar Indian problem, not there in the metros, but very much in existence in other urban centers.
• People sleeping on pavements/ railway platforms.
• Unidentified dead bodies. Creating difficulties in identification of religion and also medico- legal problems. Many could not be identified. They were photographed, given numbers and cremated/buried
• Along with humans a large number of animals, mostly cattle perished in the disaster. Their disposal became a serious health problem. There was a threat of an epidemic. Cranes and bulldozers had to be put in operation to remove the dead animals and then bury them in a mass grave disinfected with tonnes of bleaching powder.
• Administration collapsed with key functionaries running for their lives instead of manning key positions
• Relief operations became difficult as the disaster caused total enervation in those entrusted with emergency relief.

SUCCESSES
Not every thing was a failure, the Police and the Medical Department with whatever meager resources at their disposal put up a tremendous immediate response. NGOs and social service organizations moved in immediately to help in the relief efforts. Local media was extremely helpful in scotching rumors and in disseminating essential information. Even the international media cooperated. The most affected area included the Bhopal Railway Station, the station master perished from the effects of the gas but the railway personnel immediately alerted the concerned, regulating the movement of trains and thus saving many lives.
FOR THE FUTURE 
The Administration, the Police and other essential services must know the location and exact nature of any hazardous chemical that is stored by any industrial establishment. The procedure to be followed in case of exposure and the antidotal treatment should be known to the aforesaid. Adequate quantity of antidote should be available with the industry which stores such hazardous chemical.

1. The people living in the vicinity should be made aware of

• the chemicals being stored
• The likely symptoms and antidote
• Emergency procedures which should be also rehearsed
• Nearest medical facilities
• System of contacting the Factory management
• Sources of transportation for emergency evacuation and the availability of ambulances.
• Rumors and unfounded fears should countered by local Radio and TV
• NGOs and other Voluntary Organizations capable of providing help should be involved in the disaster management process and be listed and known to the administration as well as the residents of the vicinity
• Residents living in the vicinity should train with the emergency services"

I still do not believe that we are ready for handling another similar disaster. Read Mr Swaraj Puri's account of Bhopal disaster in this link.

Bayer stops MIC production

A news article mentions the following:
"In a surprise move in U.S. District Court in Charleston, attorneys for Bayer CropScience announced they were dropping plans to resume production of the chemical, commonly called MIC, and would begin dismantling the unit.
That ends the key part of the latest lawsuit in a nearly three-decade battle.But Bayer's decision erases a threat that loomed over the people of Institute for a generation.
The company will no doubt replace MIC, which is used to make a pesticide, with some other chemical, but nothing could be as bad, said Oden, a retired biology professor at West Virginia State University who still lives next to the plant."Chemicals don't have to kill," she said.
"There were so many questions that weren't answered," she said. "And I know there' no such thing as foolproof, because look at the situation in Japan. There's no safe, foolproof ways for doing most of what we do."
A 2008 accident that killed two workers and sent projectiles dangerously close to an aboveground MIC storage tank brought new scrutiny from Congress and the U.S. Chemical Safety Board.
The explosion also showed larger, more affluent communities in the Kanawha Valley that they too could be in danger — towns that the folks in Institute can't help but notice are whiter. In all, some 300,000 people live in the 25-mile MIC "vulnerability zone," which includes the state capital.
MIC is a colorless chemical used to make pesticides, polyurethane foam and plastics. It attacks the respiratory system, and at low levels, can irritate the eyes and throat. High concentrations can cause serious lung damage, hemorrhaging and death.
Several companies manufacture it, but the Institute plant is the only one in the nation that still stores it in large quantities.
Bayer has said it spent $36 million to improve safety and upgrade equipment, and that it slashed its MIC stockpile by 80 percent and eliminated all aboveground storage. How long it will take to exhaust the remaining supply and rid Institute of MIC entirely was not immediately clear.
Less than two years after Bhopal, Congress passed the federal Right-to-Know Act, to help the thousands of people around the country who live in the shadow of industry know what chemicals are made and stored in their neighborhoods. But that openness began to diminish after the terrorist attacks of 2001. Chemical plants became viewed as potential targets. Reports on the toxic inventory of industries were no longer as readily available to the public.

Read the full article in this link

A Bhopal in the USA?

An article highlights the possibility of a bhopal type disaster happening in the US. The article mentions the following:
"Bhopal should have been a wake up call, but it is unclear whether chemical plants around the world are any safer a quarter century after the December 1984 disaster—during which some 40 tons of toxic methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a pesticide plant owned by Union Carbide (now part of Dow Chemical), killing 2,259 people immediately and causing lifelong health problems and premature death for tens of thousands more.
In the U.S., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) oversees chemical and other facilities that deal with hazardous materials, making sure various “process safety” routines are followed so as to “prevent or minimize the catastrophic injury or death that could result from an accidental or purposeful release of toxic, reactive, flammable or explosive chemicals.” Also, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security instituted its own “Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards” (CFATS) that chemical and other hazardous materials facilities must follow or be shut down.
While this system has worked pretty well in the U.S. so far, some worry that a Bhopal-scale tragedy, whether due to an accident or terrorist attack, could still occur on American soil. For one, water treatment and port facilities are exempt from CFATS altogether, so some of the nation’s largest chemical facilities are not subject to as rigorous standards as they could be. A 2009 bill that passed the House of Representatives but failed to make it through the Senate addressed this and other issues. Supporters are optimistic that the bill in one form or another could resurface in future legislative sessions".
Read the article in this link

Bhopal disaster - educating our future leaders

A news article mentions that, as part of standard 8 curriculum,the NCERT has introduced a new realistic account of the Bhopal gas disaster. I am happy that authorities are taking the correct steps and educating our children who will be future leaders of tomorrow. I strongly believe that the Bhopal Gas disaster and its lessons must be made mandatory for all students of MBA, chemical engineering,cost accountancy and chartered accountant aspirants.
The news article mentions the following:
"The Social Science edition, that was released this month, recounts the story of the Bhopal gas tragedy under the chapter Law and Social Justice. It not only has a report on the industrial disaster but also raises serious concerns about the fate of the gas-affected people and the weak environment laws in the country.It dwells on how taking advantage of weak environment laws and availability of cheap labour, environmentally dangerous plants open in developing nations.
Several photographs of the incident, victims, deaths and protests have been published in the book. The background colour of the pages has been kept black while the headlines and photo captions are highlighted in red colour.
A caption of one of the pictures says: "Dow, how many more must die?"
The account begins: "The world's worst industrial tragedy took place in Bhopal 24 years ago. Union Carbide (UC), an American company, had a factory in the city in which it produced pesticides. At midnight of 2 December, methyl-isocyanate (MIC) - a highly poisonous gas - started leaking from the UC plant..."
"Within three days, more than 8,000 people were dead. Hundreds of thousands were maimed."Most of those exposed to the poison gas came from poor, working-class families, of which nearly 50,000 people are today sick to work. Among those who survived, many developed severe respiratory disorders, eye problems and other disorders. Children developed peculiar abnormalities, like the girl in the photo."
"The disaster was not an accident. UC had deliberately ignored the essential safety measures in order to cut costs. Much before the Bhopal disaster, there had been incidents of gas leak killing a worker and injuring several."
"24 years later, people are still fighting for justice: for safe drinking water, for healthcare facilities and jobs for the people poisoned by UC. They also demand that (Warren) Anderson, the UC chairman who faces criminal charges, be prosecuted."
Criticising government apathy in allowing the factory to come up, a paragraph of the chapter reads: "Government officials refused to recognize the plant as hazardous and allowed it to come up in a populated locality. When some municipal officials in Bhopal objected that the installation of an MIC production unit in 1978 was a safety violation, the position of the government was that the state needs the continued investment of the Bhopal plant, which provides jobs."
It also has a comparative account of Union Carbide's safety system in Bhopal and its other plant in the United States."At West Virginia (USA.) computerised warning and monitoring systems were in place, whereas the UC plant in Bhopal relied on manual gauges and the human senses to detect gas leaks. At the West Virginia plant, emergency evacuation plans were in place, but non-existent in Bhopal."
I hope the contents of the book are not revised!
Read the article in this link.

Bhopal - Pictures speak a thousand words

A fellow blogger had compiled various images of the Bhopal Gas Disaster and its continuing aftermath. See it in this link.

The lessons from Bhopal – Relevant more so today

26 years ago, on the night on December 2nd/3rd, 1984, on a wintry night in Bhopal, thousands of men, women and children died an excruciating death when MIC leaked from the Union Carbide factory. The survivors and the next generation children born to those exposed to the gas still are suffering from the effects of the gas. Bhopal is an ongoing tragedy and should never be forgotten. The lessons from the Bhopal Disaster are very relevant even after 26 years:
1. Do not cut costs without looking at the effects on process safety
2. Maintain all your layers of defense.
3. Continually ensure that competency of personnel operating and maintaining plants are updated and current
4. Be prepared for the worst case scenario.
5. Understand the risks and measures to eliminate / reduce or control them
6. Learn from your past incidents. Those who do not learn are condemned to repeat the incidents.
7. Pay heed to your process safety management system audit reports
Read my older post comparing the Bhopal and the BP incident of 2005 in this link

Do not forget Bhopal!

Tasleen, 26, who was poisoned by the Bhopal gas leak, cares for her disabled daughter. Photograph by Alex Masi
Every day, the people working in the chemical industry must realise that process safety is for the good of people - people inside the plant and people outside the plant. The horrors of the Bhopal Gas Disaster continue even today. We should not forget Bhopal. I think it will be a good practice for every chemical plant to organise a"Don't Forget Bhopal" day on December 2nd or 3rd every year and remind all managers of the things that went wrong at Bhopal and the lessons learnt from Bhopal..
See the human impact of Bhopal in pictures in this link.

Bhopal and BP – different approaches – different people

An article compares the difference in approaches between the Bhopal Incident and the recent BP oil rig disaster. “Both Union Carbide and BP received clear warning that their operations in Bhopal and Horizon Deepwater were not well managed and therefore had significant safety risks. Over 10 years before the actual catastrophe,a 1973 Union Carbide report signed by the Warren Anderson himself, highlighted that the unproven nature of Bhopal’s technology. In a 1982 safety review, Union Carbide’s own experts also emphasised the serious risk of substantial leaks of “toxic materials” at Bhopal. BP too received adequate warning of impending problems at Horizon Deepwater. A number of internal investigations alerted senior BP managers that safety and environmental rules at Horizon Deepwater were not being properly adhered to.”
Read the full article in this link.

Process Safety - Bhopal and BP- I Don't know!

It is eerie. 25 years ago after the Bhopal gas leak occurred, the then police chief met the security chief of Union Carbide and asked him what had leaked and what was the antidote. The answer was "I don't know". Cut to 2010. A news article mentions that "BP executives told U.S. investigators they didn’t know who was in charge of the doomed Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico or who made key decisions before the vessel exploded in April, killing 11 workers and spewing millions of barrels of crude into the sea". The testimony from Wells, the highest-ranking BP executive to appear before the joint U.S. Coast Guard-Interior Department panel probing the catastrophe, frustrated Hung Nguyen, co- chairman of the panel, who said no one from BP has accepted responsibility for actions that led to the disaster.

“We’ve had so many vice presidents of drilling come before us, I can’t even keep track,” said Nguyen, a Coast Guard captain. “A lot of them answered ‘I don’t know, I’m not responsible’ for this or that. If everybody’s in charge, nobody’s in charge, is that correct?”
One interesting point mentioned by a manager was that he could not read the well cementing procedure in his blackberry due to its small size! Now did a blackberry cause the disaster?!!!!
Read the news article in this link.

Bhopal Gas Disaster Verdict 7.6.10 - Will we ever learn?

The Bhopal Gas Disaster Court verdict on 7.6.10 highlights the following:
The following are major contributors to the disaster:
1. Gradual but sustained erosion of good maintenance practices.
2. Declining quality of technical training of plant personnel, especially its supervisory staff.
3. Depleting inventories of vital spares.
4. MIC is a highly dangerous and toxic poison, even then storage of huge quantity in large tanks was undesirable. The capacity and actual production in the Sevin Plant is not required such a huge quantity to be stored.
5. The VGS (vent gas scrubber)and refrigeration plant were not adequate to the need of hour and more so they were out of order at the relevant point of time.
6. The nitrogen pressure was not adequate for long before the incident, so it was not maintained and hardly cared about.
7. The Public Information System was failed, neither the State Govt. nor the UCC or UCIL took any steps to appraise the local public.
8. Other alarming systems were also failed.
Together these factors combined to cause the multiple failures that underlay the calamitous incident, causing a vast destruction of life.
In my various assignments of investigating incidents,some involving fatalities,one or more of the above similar causes keep repeating.Why do we NOT want to learn from mistakes? Its because of a human fallacy - the longer it gets, the more you forget about an incident!

Could another Bhopal occur in India?

I wish I could confidently say NO to the question!Though the big players take precautions,it is the small and medium scale chemical industries that require a lot of improvement.There are approximately 1700 Maximum Accident Hazard (MAH) units in India and they are supposed to carry out mock drills twice a year. Mr Bhardwaj, Member, National Disaster Management Authority is quoted as follows in an article in the Economic Times:
Mr Bhardwaj of the Authority strongly believes that such major accident hazard (MAH) units must adhere to all norms including executing two mock drills in a year. In fact, during the last four years, only 130 mock exercises took place out of which 33 happened to be in chemical industries. “We are emphasising more on prevention of such incidents rather than reacting to those. Yet, we need to prepare for any eventuality. Our mock-drills are big learning lessons as they also involve district administration,” Mr Bhardwaj says.
Read the full article in this link

Bhopal and BP - I don't know!

On Thursday, BP's CEO Tony Hayward testified before the US Congress on the spill incident. His answers to the questions put forward by the congressmen reminded me of the answers Union Carbide personnel gave the then Police Chief soon after the gas leak.The police chief had asked what was gas had leaked and what was the antidote. The answers he got was "I don't know". In Thursday's hearing, the CEO of BP also has replied in a similar tone(I am quoting from the article) "I wasn't involved in any of that decision-making," he said.Were bad decisions made about the cement?"I wasn't part of the decision-making process," he said. "I'm not a cement engineer, I'm afraid."
Also, "I am not a drilling engineer" and "I'm not an oceanographic scientist."
What about those reports that BP had been experiencing a variety of problems and delays at the well?"I had no prior knowledge."
At one point a frustrated Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., the chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, interrupted the CEO. "You're kicking the can down the road and acting as if you had nothing to do with this company and nothing to do with the decisions. I find that irresponsible."
Hayward quietly insisted: "I'm not stonewalling. I simply was not involved in the decision-making process."
Rep. Eliot Engel, D-N.Y., voiced the committee's frustrations as the afternoon wore on. "You're really insulting our intelligence," he said. "I am thoroughly disgusted."
Waxman told the BP executive that in his committee's review of 30,000 items, there was "not a single e-mail or document that you paid even the slightest attention to the dangers at this well."
There is a lesson to learn from this - how robust are your risk communication systems so that the bad news reaches the top? Read the full article in this link

Operating Procedures – Can they prevent accidents?

An article on the legal implications of the recent Bhopal Gas verdict quotes from the operating manual of Union Carbide “UCIL’s “Operating Manual Part-I – Methyl Isocyanate Unit” (October 1978), which the prosecution produced as evidence before the trial court, warned as follows: “…[i]t must be foremost in everybody’s mind that there is a probability of injury or accident round the corner. But these can be avoided if all are safety conscious and follow safety procedures strictly. Safety is our prime need. All chemicals like MIC, phosgene, HCl, CO, chlorine, MMA, chloroform and caustic soda, etc., however hazardous they are, can be handled safely by knowing the correct procedure. There is a correct way of handling them and there is ‘No Short Cut’. Any carelessness in operation will endanger you, your colleagues and everybody around you” (page 122).”
Just by having written procedures does not mean they will be followed. It depends on top management commitment to make the procedures work. And this is no easy work – it requires monitoring by top management on a 24 X 7 basis. With top management being busy always, looking at strategy, cost reduction, expansions etc, I feel that the focus sometimes does get lost. Read the full article in this link.

Bhopal - Blame it on the system!

Yesterday in an NDTV program on the Bhopal disaster verdict, the one conclusion that came through is to blame it on the system! Who designs systems? Cannot the government strengthen the systems? It is a travesty of justice for the Bhopal Victims. In 2004, on the 20th anniversary of the Bhopal Disaster, I met (Late) Ms Carolyn Meritt, then Chairperson of the CSB, at IIT Kanpur. She asked me one question, which I could not answer. Why is the PSM system not mandatory in India where Bhopal occurred? I am still looking for answers. See this youtube video on the reaction of Sathinath Sarangi, a bhopal activist.

Bhopal Gas Disaster - Precedence of Profits over People?

As expected the verdict on the Bhopal gas disaster in the Indian court has raised a hue and cry in the media. While definitely agreeing that the verdict is too little,too late, I think we are missing the bigger picture here. What has India done to prevent another Bhopal type of disaster? In the USA, OSHA CFR1910.119 Process Safety Management became mandatory in 1992 for facilities handling, storing and manufacturing highly hazardous chemicals above a certain threshold quantity. There is no such rule in India even today. Why? Even the enforcement of the other existing rules is weak due to rampant corruption. I quote from MJ Akbar's article in the Times of India:
"If there is any explanation for Delhi's fudge-and-fuss approach, it can only lie in the Indian elite's very real indifference to the poor. What, one wonders, would have been the reaction if Carbide had leaked its poison over Lutyens' Delhi rather than five kilometers from the old Bhopal city? Would Anderson have spent 25 years in Tihar rather than a villa in Hampton's?"
Read MJ Akbars article written before the verdict in this link

Bhopal Gas disaster and the recent BP oil spill

A newspaper report indicates that the verdict on the Bhopal Gas Disaster court case will be delivered on June 7th,2010 in a Bhopal Court in India. During the trial, 178 prosecution witnesses and 3008 documents were examined. The disaster happened in 1984 and the wheels of Justice move slowly! Cut to the recent BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico last month. Already the US house of representatives has begun an inquiry to pinpoint responsibility and accountability. In the Bhopal gas disaster, the entire liability was settled for 470 million US dollars. In 1989 a oil tanker called Exxon Valdez spilled oil in Alaska and the damages reportedly paid by Exxon was US dollar 5 billion. Exxon reportedly paid US dollar 940 each for every penguin that was contaminated with oil and had to be cleaned. In contrast, the Bhopal gas victims damaged for life received US Dollar 500 each!(Source: Greenpeace report).
Lets us wait for the verdict in the Bhopal Gas Disaster!!