Bhopal disaster - Police Chief's account

I met Mr Swaraj Puri, the then Chief of Bhopal Police when the Bhopal gas disaster occured, at an international conference on Bhopal gas disaster at IIT Kanpur in 2004. He recounted the horrors of that night and the difficulty he and his men faced in the aftermath of the tragedy. I chanced upon his website where he mentions all the details of that fateful night in December 1984.He mentions the following:

"The Shortcoming and the Lessons for the future
One of the first thing that struck us when the gas leak took place was our total lack of preparedness and ignorance about how to deal with such a situation.
The medical fraternity and the chemists were unaware about the effects of Methyl Isocynate on humans and also the medical treatment to deal with cases of exposure. The Chief Medical Officer of the Union Carbide Factory initially deemed MIC as only an irritant! Since the gas was of the cyanide family, Sodium Thiosulphite was administered as a probable antidote. Specifically the factory was to blame because:

• The plant did not give vital information about the storage and handling of hazardous and dangerous materials.
• Effect of MIC on humans and the antidotal treatment was not known to the medical fraternity and such knowledge if available was not disseminated to the emergency services.
• There was a lack of appreciation of disaster management within the Government and also inadequate co-ordination between the factory and the emergency services.
• There was an absence of proper warning system in the plant. No practice drills were ever held.
• Union Carbide itself had limited data on MIC and probably had never anticipated the 'worst case scenario
• Poor plant maintenance practices. Inventory of vital spares had been depleted.
• Exodus of some of the experienced engineers and operating personnel from the plant.
• Economy measures, overriding safety concerns.

Apart from these, we noticed some other difficulties all inextricably linked up with the developmental process in the country.

• Densely populated areas around the plant. Often shanties / slums come up on vacant areas surrounding the factories greatly increasing the danger of loss to human life. Urban planning authorities are powerless, there is an absence of political will since much of the problem is caused by the poor flocking to the cities in search of employment.
• Absence of a proper road network, rescue workers had to move on foot through densely populated areas
• Poor communications, though things have improved now.
• Lack of effective emergency medical facilities.
• Inadequate transport for emergency evacuation, even today the infrastructure is woefully in adequate.
• Cattle living in residential areas, a peculiar Indian problem, not there in the metros, but very much in existence in other urban centers.
• People sleeping on pavements/ railway platforms.
• Unidentified dead bodies. Creating difficulties in identification of religion and also medico- legal problems. Many could not be identified. They were photographed, given numbers and cremated/buried
• Along with humans a large number of animals, mostly cattle perished in the disaster. Their disposal became a serious health problem. There was a threat of an epidemic. Cranes and bulldozers had to be put in operation to remove the dead animals and then bury them in a mass grave disinfected with tonnes of bleaching powder.
• Administration collapsed with key functionaries running for their lives instead of manning key positions
• Relief operations became difficult as the disaster caused total enervation in those entrusted with emergency relief.

SUCCESSES
Not every thing was a failure, the Police and the Medical Department with whatever meager resources at their disposal put up a tremendous immediate response. NGOs and social service organizations moved in immediately to help in the relief efforts. Local media was extremely helpful in scotching rumors and in disseminating essential information. Even the international media cooperated. The most affected area included the Bhopal Railway Station, the station master perished from the effects of the gas but the railway personnel immediately alerted the concerned, regulating the movement of trains and thus saving many lives.
FOR THE FUTURE 
The Administration, the Police and other essential services must know the location and exact nature of any hazardous chemical that is stored by any industrial establishment. The procedure to be followed in case of exposure and the antidotal treatment should be known to the aforesaid. Adequate quantity of antidote should be available with the industry which stores such hazardous chemical.

1. The people living in the vicinity should be made aware of

• the chemicals being stored
• The likely symptoms and antidote
• Emergency procedures which should be also rehearsed
• Nearest medical facilities
• System of contacting the Factory management
• Sources of transportation for emergency evacuation and the availability of ambulances.
• Rumors and unfounded fears should countered by local Radio and TV
• NGOs and other Voluntary Organizations capable of providing help should be involved in the disaster management process and be listed and known to the administration as well as the residents of the vicinity
• Residents living in the vicinity should train with the emergency services"

I still do not believe that we are ready for handling another similar disaster. Read Mr Swaraj Puri's account of Bhopal disaster in this link.