January 19, 2020

Are you identifying human factors in HAZOP studies?

On 6.9.19, at Amsterdam airport, a Boeing 737, aircraft was taxiing in a northerly direction on taxiway Charlie to runway 18C when it received take-off clearance for that runway. The flight crew then drove on taxiway Delta in a southerly direction and commenced the take-off. Air traffic control noticed this and instructed the crew to stop immediately. The crew aborted the take-off run and taxied back to the start of runway 18C, after which the aircraft took off uneventfully.
Source:Quaterly aviation report, Dutch Safety Board, July-September 2019

Are you identifying human factors in HAZOP studies?

January 4, 2020

My article on Flare Systems published in Chemical Engineering progress of AIChE

When I started my career 40 years ago, I used to be an avid reader (and still continue to be) of Chemical Engineering Progress of the AIChE. The articles helped me throughout my career. I am happy to say that my third article
"Manage Change to Flare Systems" has been published in the January 2020 issue of CEP. Please see it in this link

January 3, 2020

Glycols can burn

Incident #1
An atmospheric tank overfilled with glycol. The glycol came in contact with a nearby burner, igniting and causing a fire.
Incdient #2
Employees #1 and #2 were installing a platform on top of a storage tank containing ethylene glycol. While the tank was receiving an ethylene glycol mixture from the process line, Employee #1 began to weld a clip on the tank. Shortly after striking the arc, the top of the tank blew open and the contents ignited. Employee #1 received burns, lacerations, and fractures which later resulted in his death and Employee #2 received minor cuts and bruises.  Source: osha.gov

Have you checked the MSDS of the glycols you are using? Often operators think that glycol is not flammable.

December 31, 2019

2020 - Happy New Year!

Wishing my readers and their families a very happy 2020! Lets all work together to make 2020 safer than the previous years and avoid LOPC incidents!
Thank you for taking the readership of my blog to above 300,000 views.

Are your pressure relief valves sized corretcly?

Employee #1, the basement operator at a powerhouse, was purging the liquid residue from the betene entrainment tank to the #16 boiler. Water and steam inadvertently got into the knockout pot, and materials that react to water, such as, but not limited to, acetic anhydride and diketene were in the tank. A reaction occurred, releasing flammable and hazardous materials into the atmosphere through a safety relief valve. The pressure relief device was only sized for an external fire, not a chemical reaction. As a result, the safety relief valves could not withstand the reaction. The overpressurization caused the steel pot to fail and explode. Employee #1 was killed.
Source:osha.gov

December 26, 2019

Another incident where "tryout" was not done

On July 23, 2009, Employee #1 and a coworker, both contract employees specializing in preparation of refinery equipment for entry, were installing blinds in piping preparatory to confined space entry for inspection and maintenance. The pressure vessel was removed from service, cleaned, flushed and drained. The column was under a nitrogen purge of approximately one psi to facilitate the draining. Employee #1 and the coworker encountered pressurized steam at the top of the vessel while installing the blinds. At the bottom of the vessel, Employee #1 and the coworker began to loosen flange bolts when they encountered hot water leaking from the 16 bolt, 300 lb flange. As Employee #1 loosened one of the last two bolts, the flange opened and Employee #1 was sprayed with 197 degree F hot oily water. Employee #1 sustained first and second degree burns to the neck, arms, shoulder and upper back. Employee #1 was hospitalized. It was determined the Controlling Employer did not verify that the equipment had been deenergized.
Source: osha.gov

December 25, 2019

How do you try out hazardous energy systems?

Two maintenance men at an electric power generation plant removed a check valve cover from a steam system. The section of the steam line was isolated and tagged, but it could not be vented or drained first. The section was only partially depressurized when the cover was loosened. When the employees removed all fasteners holding the cover in place, it blew off, and the steam line sprayed the two employees with steam and hot water. The employees were wearing safety glasses and work gloves, but were not using any other shielding or protective clothing. The employees received second degree burns over 20 percent of their bodies.
Source: osha.gov