August 2, 2016

Mobile phone usage in chemical plants

I am reproducing a good discussion in a process safety forum in Linkedin (Process safety management) here:
  • David Moore Allowing mobile phone use in a control room is not an area classification issue. Control rooms are typically located within a NEC classified area but the interior of the control room is not classified - i.e. it's unclassified. Control rooms are kept unclassified by means of a ventilation system keeping the control room environment at a pressure higher than the outside atmosphere. This pressurized system keeps outside toxic or explosive vapors from leaking into the control room. Since the control room is unclassified then any general purpose electrical device is allowed in the control room. As a matter of fact, it would be impossible to have all the electronics that are necessary to be in the control room be intrinsically safe or explosion proof. This is why control rooms are unclassified. 
  • Karl-Fred Woerner I agree with David. One reason not to allow mobile phones in control room is potential distraction. We do not allow privat mobile phones in control rooms. Before allowing mobile phones in a blast resistant building you should also check connectivity because the steel used in the construction migth might function as a shield.

  • Richard Palluzi Standard cell phones are not approved for electrically classified areas. Yet many studies have indicated that the chance of ignition is very low. Most petrochemical organizations will not allow them; I suspect more from a liability issue than a technical issue. It would be great to have an AICHE, ISA, API, ASSE, or NFPA study of the real technical risks. Sadly it's unlikely to happen as testing is very expensive and with the large number of different types doing any meaningful testing is probably problematical at best.
    In addition to the potential ignition source issues, the question of distractions always arises. Yet, at the same time, most organizations have so integrated cell phone use into their daily business that lack of access is a definite reduction in efficiency. The impossible (or at least very difficult) issue to address is how to allow normal company business while excluding needless distractions. Most organizations have some restrictions in place at least on paper.

  • Luis Eduardo Pardo Diaz Greetings, there are several reasons why cell phone use in control rooms is prohibited, among the most outstanding are:
    1. distracter for operations: can you imagine an operator control panel working and talking on the phone at the same time? ¿Differentiating between sounds alarm signals and tones phone?
    Simply because of the sensitivity of the operations control room, should minimize the factors which could cause distraction operators control panel. This is the main reason for the restriction.
    2. Possibly the emission of signals or other cellular radios, instruments may alter operating wirelessly, which generate false signals and the problems that we know that these can generate.
    3. The cell phone is not a certified electronic equipment for hazardous areas and remember that by the characteristics of the control room, they can be exposed to flammable gases and vapors, and cell element could be the initiator of an explosion or fire.
    Happy day.

  • Daniel Lewis In the classified area - Agreed, standard personal mobile phones are not rated and therefore present a risk of fire, even if this risk is low.
    In unrated control rooms or break rooms - There are numerous other unrated electrical devices in these rooms, so they do not create an increased ignition risk. It is a management issue to make sure employees are not using them excessively, and that they do not carry them outside into the classified area. 

  • Jeremy Roland My question would by why do they want to have cell phones in those areas? Typically the floor employees have no need for a phone to conduct their tasks. Often times they will never even question these policies. Managers on the other hand seem to be unable, or unwilling to put their phones down. They often question these policies because they feel that they need to have their phone on them at all times. My question to them would be what is more important not missing an email, text, or call or not blowing themselves and everyone else up. . Even if the chances are a million to one that it could happen i would not want to risk being that one.
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July 29, 2016

Production without danger, or who controls the process safety in Tatarstan Source : http://realnoevremya.com/today/386

 Production without danger, or who controls the process safety in Tatarstan Source : http://realnoevremya.com/today/386

Good article with points that are relevant to all

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July 6, 2016

Tesla driver killed while using autopilot

Tesla driver killed while using autopilot: The U.S. announced on Thursday the 40-year-old owner of a technology company who nicknamed his vehicle “Tessy” and had praised its sophisticated “autopilot” system just one month earlier for preventi

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July 4, 2016

Case study on chlorine leak

Read the case study on the chlorine leak in Mumbai port trust in 2010 in this link

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July 2, 2016

Three killed in boiler blast

News reports coming in of a boiler blast at a major ammonia urea complex in Mumbai. Reportedly, 3 people are killed and 5 have been injured. The blast is supposed to have occurred when maintenance work was n progress. We have to wait for the investigation details to come out.

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July 1, 2016

Mafunctioning instrument air regulator incident

Instrument technicians were re-calibrating a control valve positioner. The feedback arm between the valve and the positioner was disconnected, a mA source was connected, and the valve was stroked using the flapper & nozzle arrangement inside the positioner. While doing this, due to a faulty regulator, full instrument air pressure of 8.5 bar was applied and the top of the diaphragm casing ruptured propelling it far away. On investigation, inside the regulator, three screws had become loose in service due to vibration. The regulator did not have full rated relief and no external relief device was fitted as part of the original valve supply.

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June 28, 2016

Resilience and the Pembroke refinery explosion

Interesting article in this link: Resilience and the Pembroke refinery explosion

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June 24, 2016

Achieving zero accidents

Article by Chevron on how they are achieving zero accidents in this link 

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June 21, 2016

Crane collapse at refinery

 Crane collapse at refinery


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June 16, 2016

Fall inside reactor

After helping to dismantle a metal scaffold inside a reactor, a worker was at the base of the reactor getting ready to exit through the overhead reactor manhole. While the worker was climbing up 14 meters up the vertical rope ladder, he fell and landed at the base of the reactor. He had not anchored his safety harness though he was wearing one. The worker was immediately rescued but he died on the way to the hospital. Climbing up rope ladders is physically exhausting the the fitness of the person is important. Provide anchoring system for the safety harness while climbing up rope ladders inside vessels.
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June 13, 2016

Look alikes causes fatality

Two maintenance workers were trying to remove a safety valve after obtaining work permit, when one of them was overcome with H2S and fell from the scaffolding and died. Both workers had unscrewed the flange bolts of the wrong safety valve. There were two safety valves that were identical in nature at the same location. One was isolated and permit handed over to remove that. But the workers opened the valve in service. What system do you have to prevent similar accidents?


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June 9, 2016

The long story of barges and ammonia transportation

The long story of barges and ammonia transportation:

The recent incident in which a leak in an ammonia tank headed for the Fertilizers and Chemicals campus takes memories back to the long history of the public sector company using Kochi’s backwaters to

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June 6, 2016

Safety norms thrown to winds at pharma, chemical units?

Safety norms thrown to winds at pharma, chemical units?:

“All the three versions will be clubbed and submitted to the District Collector for action,” said Joint Collector-2 D.V. Reddy, who had come to inspect the accident site at Srikar Laboratories.“Firstl

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June 3, 2016

Barge ban leaves FACT in fix

Barge ban leaves FACT in fix:

“The very existence of FACT is dependent on the continuing production of fertilizers, for which ammonia transportation by barge is absolutely essential,” it added.
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June 2, 2016

One killed, 15 injured in pharma unit blast

Thanks to Mr Satya Subrahmanyam for sending news about this incident.

One killed, 15 injured in pharma unit blast:

Immediately after the explosion, ammonia gas leaked and a woman was among the 15 affected. “Ramakrishna’s lungs were filled with the gas and he died before we could shift him to a hospital,” said DCP
From the photo in the article, it is eerily similar to a CSB case study where an ammonia exchanger exploded due to overpressurisation as its safety valve was blocked.
Read the CSB case study in this link

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