February 27, 2015

Depending on ROV's for isolation is bad design

An accident in a refinery in 2007 that killed 4 contract workers highlights the dangers of depending only on ROV's (remotely operated valves) for isolation. A maintenance job was being carried out on a hot oil line. Operators closed a ROV in the line and issued the permit to remove a blind on the downstream flange of the ROV. Instrument air to the ROV was left open. (ROV is a fail to close valve) When the maintenance workers were fixing the chain block to remove the blind, it inadvertently hit the switch on the ROV control field panel and opened the valve, causing hot pressurised oil to spray, ignite and kill the 4 workers.  

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February 24, 2015

Blast in Hyderabad-two-die-13-hurt- Times of India

Blast in Hyderabad, two die, 13 hurt - Times of India

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Lessons from Fukushima

Read the lessosn learnt from Fukushima in this link  http://nas-sites.org/fukushima/files/2012/10/Kitazawa.pdf

It applies to us in the CPI, too!


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February 22, 2015

Management decision during crisis

Continuing with Fukushima, a very interesting read on Fukushima and management decisions!
http://www.nikkeibp.co.jp/rebuild/en/article_09/index_03.shtml

 
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February 16, 2015

Don't Normalise deviations!

 In 1994, a fatality caused by exposure to hydrogen sulfide occurred at a refinery. The accident  occurred while draining of a fuel gas knockout drum in a hydro treating unit. Normal work procedures included periodically opening a valve that carried a water-gas mixture to a separator which removed and vented hydrocarbon gases to a flare. During the preceding winter, the piping to the separator froze, and the drum was temporarily drained to the sewer. This deviation went unnoticed and the temporary practice of draining to the sewer continued. On the day of the incident, the operator opened the valve to the sewer believing it to be part of the draining procedure, resulting in the release of toxic amounts of hydrogen sulfide that killed the operator.

Source: osha.gov

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February 12, 2015

February 11, 2015

Explosion in pyrolysis plant

 Read case study of explosion in pyrolysis plant


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