A five-person crew was valving in a second stage reheater at an electric
 power generation station. They were slowly opening two valves to bring 
the reheater online. Two of the employees were stationed at one valve, 
and the other three were at the second valve. Two other employees were 
working in the immediate area, observing the reheater's drain tank 
levels after having adjusted an automatic valve about 30 minutes before.
 The drain line for the reheater ruptured downstream of the valves, 
releasing steam and hot water into the area. The rupture was caused by 
excessive pressure in the line as a result of a water hammer. The water 
hammer was caused by the presence of lower pressure on the downstream 
side of the valves than on the upstream side. This produced a back flow 
in the line. The operating procedure for the valves in the line during 
start up operations had been changed earlier in the year to eliminate 
water hammer that had occurred previously. However, the new changes were
 not incorporated into the written operating procedures being used at 
the time of the accident. Seven employees (all five members of the work 
crew plus the two other employees working in the area) received 
second-degree burns to multiple parts of their bodies. They were 
hospitalized for their injuries.
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