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October 29, 2015

When cranes collapse

See a video and photographs of crane accident that happened in Aug 15 in the Netherlands in this link
There are lessons to learn....

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October 26, 2015

Be careful when dealing with pressurised lines

A man was killed in an accident involving a high-pressure water line at a well site. The victim along with two other men
was trying to heat a frozen high-pressure water line when the line ruptured. The victim was hit by a stream of high pressure water  at a pressure of 3,500 to 4,500 psi.The victim died from the impact of the water.

Read another safety alert from HSE UK http://www.hse.gov.uk/safetybulletins/hydraulic-injection-injury.htm


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October 22, 2015

Sealant reinjection incident investigation

A paper presented in the Process safety congress at Dordrecht on June 4th, 2015 depicts the detailed incident investigation of the accident at a refinery in Antwerp in 2013 during sealant re injection. Read about it in this link.

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October 19, 2015

Readers response to post

Mr M.K.Rao, Executive Director of India Glycols responded to my post "Of Mimic panels and Video walls - back to the past?"
His reply is as follows:

"The subject Blog item is interesting and highly relevant too.

When I entered the DMT control room (IPCL, Baroda) in the year 1981, the scene was similar. The space above the pneumatic controllers had a mimic panel that depicted the complete PFD. In addition, we had a model of the entire plant on a large table in the same control room at a corner. It made learning faster and we used to have a better feel of the process. It was easier to know what was going on at a glance.
 

Going by the best of Past & Present, I feel a combination of
  1. DCS work stations
  2. Mimic panel representing the complete/ continuous PFD like in the past (Instead of Video panels – which may appear broken)
  3. A model (physical) of the plant right in the control room would help"

I agree with his valid suggestions and thank him for responding..
 

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October 17, 2015

Hydrogen explosion incident

 Read about a hydrogen explosion in a compressor in this link.


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October 16, 2015

Get To The Root Of Accidents | Chemical Processing

Get To The Root Of Accidents | Chemical Processing


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October 13, 2015

Dead leg incident

 Read an incident involving a piping dead leg in this link.

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October 12, 2015

Of Mimic panels and Video walls - back to the past??

 I just returned from a large modern refinery. When I visited the control room, with large video walls, my thoughts went back to 1979 when I was operating an ammonia plant with pneumatic controllers and no DCS. The wall above the controllers had a mimic panel that depicted the complete process flow diagrammatically. This depiction covered the whole control room wall between the controllers and the ceiling, so it was large and easy to see.  The motors and pumps had running lamp indications in the panel. For 300 control loops, we had about 200 hard wired alarms located between the controllers in sets of 20.

See a concocted image of a mimic panel located above pneumatic controllers similar to the one I had used below:





















The modern control room I visited looked similar to the one below, with large video walls:









I was recollecting the progress in instrumentation - from pneumatic control systems to electronic to DCS without video walls and now DCS with video walls. - back to the past!!!!
Technology can and will always be an enabler only and as long as human beings exist, human errors will continue...take for instance the modern day DCS. We have so many alarms that inundate the operator during plant upsets, that vendors now sell alarm suppression software! Why do we need that many alarms in the first place???

One important philosophy in Process Safety - KEEP IT SIMPLE AND DON'T FORGET THE PAST!!

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Fire in a laboratory of an industrial gas facility

Reports coming in of a fire in the laboratory of an industrial gas facility in Singapore. Reportedly one person was killed. Read about the incident and see the photos  in this link.

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October 10, 2015

A temporary change causes a fatality

Temporary changes are dangerous if not managed properly. Read about an incident involving a temporary change that causes a fatality. This incident highlights what Dr trevor Kletz used to say "We do not know what we do not know"
Read the incident in this link.

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October 7, 2015

Overheated air compressor causes fatality

 Read about an incident involving an overheated air compressor that caused a fatality in this link

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October 3, 2015

4 workers hurt in explosion at SunEdison's Texas plant : Business

 New coming in about a fire in a polysilicon plant in USA involving Silane. Read about it in this link:
  4 workers hurt in explosion at SunEdison's Texas plant : Business


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CO2 Gas Hazards in the Brewing Industry

Don't take CO2 for granted thinking it will not harm you. Read this article:
CO2 Gas Hazards in the Brewing Industry

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October 1, 2015

Du Pont incident recommendations by CSB

The CSB has approved the draft recommendations in the DuPont incident last year at LaPorte, Texas that killed 4 employees. I observe many similar instances in batch processes in various manufacturing units in the pesticide industry during PSM audits. The CSB recommendations are given below:

"Pursuant to its authority under 42 U.S.C. §7412(r)(6)(C)(i) and (ii), and in the interest of promoting safer operations at US facilities handling chemicals and protecting workers and communities from hazards, the Board makes the following interim safety recommendations to the DuPont chemical manufacturing facility in La Porte, Texas and the International Chemical Workers Union Council of the United Food and Commercial Workers:
Inherently Safer Design Review
Prior to resuming Insecticide Business Unit (IBU) manufacturing operations, conduct a comprehensive engineering analysis of the manufacturing building and the discharge of pressure relief systems with toxic chemical scenarios to assess potential inherently safer design options. At a minimum, evaluate the use of an open building structure, and the direction of toxic chemical leaks and the discharge of pressure relief systems with toxic chemical scenarios to a destruction system. Implement inherently safer design principles to the greatest extent feasible and effectively apply the hierarchy of controls such that neither workers nor the public are harmed from potential highly toxic chemical releases. Detail the analysis, findings, and corrective actions in a written report and make this report available to DuPont La Porte employees, their representatives, and the CSB.
Ensure Manufacturing Building is Safe for Workers
Prior to resuming Insecticide Business Unit (IBU) manufacturing operations, conduct a robust engineering evaluation of the manufacturing building and the dilution air ventilation system that includes the implementation of corrective action(s) to the greatest extent feasible in order to ensure a safe environment for all workers. Develop a documented design basis for the manufacturing building and the air dilution ventilation system that identifies effective controls for highly toxic, asphyxiation, and flammability hazards and implement these controls to the greatest extent feasible. Address non routine operations and emergency response activities in the design basis. The design basis for the manufacturing building and the dilution air ventilation system must use the hierarchy of controls and inherently safer design principles to the greatest extent feasible.
Ensure Relief System Design is Safe for Workers and the Public
Prior to resuming manufacturing operations, ensure all Insecticides Business Unit (IBU) pressure relief systems are routed to a safe location and effectively apply the hierarchy of controls to protect workers and the public. Commission a pressure relief device analysis, consistent with API Standard 521 and the ASME Code, including a field review. Include an evaluation of relief system discharge location to ensure that relief systems are discharged to a safe location that will prevent toxic exposure, flammability, or asphyxiation hazards in order to ensure public and worker health and safety to the greatest extent feasible. Include an evaluation of relief scenarios consistent with API Standard 521.
Perform More Robust Process Hazard Analyses
Develop and implement an expedited schedule to perform more robust process hazard analyses (PHAs) consistent with R1, R2, and R3 for all units within the Insecticides Business Unit (IBU). At a minimum, the PHAs must effectively identify and control the hazards referenced in this document utilizing the hierarchy of controls. The PHA schedule must be prioritized based on anticipated risks to the public and workers in order to ensure that the highest risk areas receive priority consideration. At a minimum, the more robust PHAs must be consistent with the approach applied to post-incident reviews described above in paragraph 10.
Ensure Active Workforce Participation
Work together with the International Chemical Workers Union Council of the United Food and commercial Workers (ICWUC/UFCW) Local 900C and the ICWUC/UFCW staff (at the request of the local) to develop and implement a plan to ensure active participation of the workforce and their representatives in the implementation of Recommendations R1 through R4. In addition, provide a copy of DuPont’s integrated plan for restart to La Porte workers and their local union representatives.
Public Transparency and Accountability
Make publicly available (on a website) a summary of the DuPont November 15, 2014 incident investigation report, the integrated plan for restart, and actions to be taken for the implementation of Recommendations R1 through R5. This website must be periodically updated to accurately reflect the integrated plan for restart and implementation of Recommendations R1 through R5."




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Safe in India - a new initiative

I came across the website www.safeinindia.org run by three IIM graduates. SafeInIndia is an initiative to address the issue of crush injuries in the Automotive Sector and work on win-win sustainable solutions.
Glad to see such initiatives springing up. Their report on the automobile sector is available for download from their website which can be accessed here www.safeinindia.org.
 
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