The saga of the missing Malaysian airlines MH370 flight highlights the fact that technology is an enabler but it cannot override the human. The way in which vendors are hard selling process safety technology these days worries me. A typical case is SIL rated instrumented systems. While the statistics and numbers sound very good, no vendor is gong to tell you about the life cycle needs and cost of maintaining these systems.
Nowadays, I also see many cases of the operation staff left out of the design loop. The net result is that the operator gets a system which leads to work overload during emergencies. Then the vendor hard sells "alarm management software"!!
Somewhere in our journey of process safety management we have forgotten Dr Trevor Kletz's inherent safety philosophy of "keeping it simple".
I often see complicated PSM systems in many "World Class" companies. These systems are "managed" by separate PSM cells.....have we forgotten that the owner of PSM is operations? I often see the systems getting more complicated because the PSM cell needs to justify their existence! (My due apologies if I have hurt anyone).
Having had the fortune to learn about process safety when the word was not in "fashion" , I pray the post bhopal generation of chemical engineers realise that managing process safety is not only about technology........design it for humans who make mistakes.....keep it simple and easy to understand.
Contribute to the surviving victims of Bhopal by buying my book "Practical Process Safety Management"
Nowadays, I also see many cases of the operation staff left out of the design loop. The net result is that the operator gets a system which leads to work overload during emergencies. Then the vendor hard sells "alarm management software"!!
Somewhere in our journey of process safety management we have forgotten Dr Trevor Kletz's inherent safety philosophy of "keeping it simple".
I often see complicated PSM systems in many "World Class" companies. These systems are "managed" by separate PSM cells.....have we forgotten that the owner of PSM is operations? I often see the systems getting more complicated because the PSM cell needs to justify their existence! (My due apologies if I have hurt anyone).
Having had the fortune to learn about process safety when the word was not in "fashion" , I pray the post bhopal generation of chemical engineers realise that managing process safety is not only about technology........design it for humans who make mistakes.....keep it simple and easy to understand.
Contribute to the surviving victims of Bhopal by buying my book "Practical Process Safety Management"
This is a very important blog for chemical engineers. The message that a vibrant and effective PSM system critically depends on operations people for its usefulness in a fundamental principle.
ReplyDeleteFrom my experience, I have seen often times the top management mistakenly assumes that the shop floor guys cannot be entrusted to care for and contribute to the vitality of the system and therefore they assign this to "experts". Unfortunately, the experts in most cases do not have the inclination to walk around and talk to people.
There could be other reasons, but I think all of them centre around the top manager's own approach.