In 1996, an OSHA office investigated an explosion and
fire which occurred at a custom chemical blending ("toll blending") facility,
resulting in the deaths of five employees and the destruction of the
facility. The report mentions that "The employees were in the process of making "Gold Precipitating
Agent" by blending 5,400 lbs. of sodium hydrosulfite, 1,800 lbs. of aluminum
powder, 900 lbs. of potassium carbonate, and 8 liters of benzaldehyde.
Sodium hydrosulfite and aluminum powder are highly water reactive and
aluminum powder in this quantity has catastrophic potential. Neither of
these materials are covered by 29 CFR 1910.119.
The employer's representatives stated that they relied on the information in
the material safety data sheets (MSDSs) to perform a brief hazard review.
This review failed to identify the hazards of that mixture. The mixing was
done in a 125 cubic foot blender that had a water-cooled mechanical seal. It
is very likely that water inadvertently entered the blend. Mechanical seals
are known throughout the industry to be prone to this type of failure.
Symptoms of a leak were noted and reported, but only to employees who did not
know that water reactive chemicals were to be blended. A mechanical problem
developed with the liquid feed system, which had not been checked prior to
the addition of the dry ingredients. This caused a deviation from the
standard operating procedures and the dry ingredients remained in the blender
for a much longer period than originally anticipated. Water entering the
subsurface caused the sodium hydrosulfite and possibly the aluminum powder to
react, slowly at first. The large volume of powder did not conduct heat
readily and the exothermic reaction intensified. In response to noxious
gases being released, the employer decided to unload the blender, based upon
the information in the MSDS for the finished blend. During the unloading
process, an ignition and explosion occurred, propelling the vessel and its
concrete supports approximately 48 feet. The pressure wave destroyed part of
the facility and caused four of the five deaths; the fifth employee was
killed by the ensuing fire, which destroyed most of the plant"
Read the complete details in this link
Contribute to the surviving victims of Bhopal by buying my book "Practical Process Safety Management"
Read the complete details in this link
Contribute to the surviving victims of Bhopal by buying my book "Practical Process Safety Management"
No comments:
Post a Comment