Further to my post on the anniversary of Bhopal disaster, I am quoting below from the HSE UK report on the Buncefield oil depot fire (2005) investigation:
"This report does not identify any new learning about major accident prevention. Rather it serves to reinforce some important process safety management principles that have been known for some time:
There should be a clear understanding of major accident risks and the safety critical equipment and systems designed to control them.
This understanding should exist within organisations from the senior management down to the shop floor, and it needs to exist between all organisations involved in supplying, installing, maintaining and operating these controls.
There should be systems and a culture in place to detect signals of failure in safety critical equipment and to respond to them quickly and effectively.
In this case, there were clear signs that the equipment was not fit for purpose but no one questioned why, or what should be done about it other than ensure a series of temporary fixes.
Time and resources for process safety should be made available.
The pressures on staff and managers should be understood and managed so that they have the capacity to apply procedures and systems essential for safe operation.
Once all the above are in place:
There should be effective auditing systems in place which test the quality of management systems and ensure that these systems are actually being used on the ground and are effective.
At the core of managing a major hazard business should be clear and positive process safety leadership with board-level involvement and competence to ensure that major hazard risks are being properly managed"
Contribute to the surviving victims of Bhopal by buying my book "Practical Process Safety Management"
"This report does not identify any new learning about major accident prevention. Rather it serves to reinforce some important process safety management principles that have been known for some time:
There should be a clear understanding of major accident risks and the safety critical equipment and systems designed to control them.
This understanding should exist within organisations from the senior management down to the shop floor, and it needs to exist between all organisations involved in supplying, installing, maintaining and operating these controls.
There should be systems and a culture in place to detect signals of failure in safety critical equipment and to respond to them quickly and effectively.
In this case, there were clear signs that the equipment was not fit for purpose but no one questioned why, or what should be done about it other than ensure a series of temporary fixes.
Time and resources for process safety should be made available.
The pressures on staff and managers should be understood and managed so that they have the capacity to apply procedures and systems essential for safe operation.
Once all the above are in place:
There should be effective auditing systems in place which test the quality of management systems and ensure that these systems are actually being used on the ground and are effective.
At the core of managing a major hazard business should be clear and positive process safety leadership with board-level involvement and competence to ensure that major hazard risks are being properly managed"
Contribute to the surviving victims of Bhopal by buying my book "Practical Process Safety Management"
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