Lessons from emergency response

That's me standing in yellow bunker gear (First left, next to Instructor) during the intensive emergency response training course at Dubai in 1996! In my 32 year career, I have seen many plant emergencies and there are always some lessons to be learnt. Murphy's law always applies during emergencies! But it is always better to be prepared both mentally and physically. An article by FEMA on one of the worst chlorine releases in the USA (70 MT was released) summarises the lessons learnt from that incident:
"Lessons Learned
1. The problems associated with a high-risk occupancy in one jurisdiction, creating a prob­lem in a different jurisdiction, present obvious challenges for emergency planning response agencies.
In this case the responding agencies worked well together, but the deficiencies of the regulatory and planning processes were a major focus of attention after the incident.
2. The Incident Command System (ICS) proved to be extremely effective in this incident, par­ticularly in coordinating the efforts of several different agencies at the scene.
The ability to assign major responsibilities to command officers from different fire depart­ments, without any problems, is evidence that the personnel are trained and prepared to operate effectively.
3. The lack of effective radio communications between agencies was a problem at this incident.
Cellular telephones were used very effectively to supplement public safety radio capabilities and proved to be reliable under these circumstances. In other situations cellular telephone service has been compromised by the number of persons trying to use the systems under emergency conditions and particularly the heavy use of the systems by news media personnel. The loca­tion and time of day may have been key factors in making the cellular network responsive in this incident. Note: Centel Cellular will block off communications allowing only emergency personnel phones to work if the system starts to overload.
4. The decision between evacuating residents and warning them to remain indoors, with win­dows and outside air inlets closed, is often critical.
In this case, it was considered more practical to keep patients inside the hospital than to expose them to the outside atmosphere. This took into consideration the susceptibility of the patients to chlorine exposure, the ability to exclude outside air from the ventilation system and the avail­ability of medical personnel and equipment inside the hospital. Some area residents reported that they were notified to evacuate and were exposed to the chlorine cloud while waiting for busses to pick them up. The risk of exposure during evacuation may have been greater than the risk if they had remained indoors.
5. The use of buses operated by fire department personnel is a practical means to evacuate residents.
It is more feasible to have firefighters drive buses than to train bus drivers to use SCBA. It is equally difficult for firefighters using SCBA to convince residents to expose themselves to the outside atmosphere in order to evacuate, unless the residents are already in distress. The contin­gency plan, sending a crew of SCBA-equipped firefighters on a bus to enter and evacuate an area in immediate danger, is a practical innovation.
6. Police officers, who are not provided with or trained to use SCBA, were effective in evacuat­ing areas ahead of the contamination, but could not function in the contaminated areas.
Several police officers who were assigned to traffic control or to assist with evacuation were exposed to the chlorine cloud and transported themselves to medical facilities for evaluation in the later stages of the incident.
7. Due to the relatively low concentration of chlorine in the gas cloud, in this case, the pre­dominant medical condition was limited to short duration respiratory irritation.
Chlorine is detectable by odor at very low concentrations and is a respiratory irritant between 3 and 30 ppm. Individuals with chronic respiratory problems, such as asthma, were quickly affected and accounted for most of the hospital admissions.
8. It proved to be extremely difficult to determine the size, shape, and movement of the chlorine cloud.
Helicopter observation was a valuable asset, particularly with increasing daylight. Ground sam­pling over large areas is difficult to coordinate and requires careful mapping to be effective. An attempt was made to predict dispersion of the chlorine using CAMEO (a computer model pro­gram), but complicated factors of terrain, slope, temperature, wind velocity, relative humidity, and an unknown rate of release made predictions extremely difficult.
9. The application of water to the vapor cloud was considered in this situation to accelerate the evaporation of the pooled liquid.
Conventional wisdom suggests that massive applications of water spray could absorb chlorine from the air, resulting in a dilute liquid solution. Chlorine has a low rate of solubility in water, and, with a large leak, there is a concern that applying less-than-sufficient volumes of water would create a corrosive fog. Applying water to a container of liquefied chlorine could heat the contents to their boiling temperature and cause the container to rupture. It is often difficult or impossible to estimate the flow and rate of vaporization from a leak to make such determinations.
10. The delay in notification of the fire department and other agencies indicates a problem with plant personnel and the established standard operating procedures at the facility.
A review of communications tapes reveals that no call was received by the police or fire depart­ments for this incident from the facility. A private-sector ambulance provider had been requested to respond to transport plant employees who had been exposed to the chlorine gas.
11. While emergency procedures had been planned for the chlorine facility itself, there was no specific plan for notification or evacuation in the event of a chlorine leak or other emer­gency extending beyond the property line.
Due to the risk created by the chemical industries in the area, the need for emergency warning systems should be evaluated. This level of planning requires both private- and public-sector participation.
12. The fact that the incident occurred at the facility where the CHLOREP Team equipment was stored caused unusual problems. Most of the equipment that could have most valuable in trying to secure the leak could not be reached because it was in the Hazmat area. This included the SCBA units normally used by the team members, which are of a different type from those used by area fire departments. Another chemical plant in the area was able to provide the needed SCBAs for the plant members on the entry team".

Read the excellent article in this link.