Organisational culture and Process Safety

I always keep wondering why companies spend so much money on implementing behaviour based safety systems when in real life, what is actually required is the behaviour of top management towards process safety! If top management are able to track and recognize the process safety issues that need attending to, then the organizational culture will be conducive for the success of PSM. A walk around by top management to every nook and corner of their plant once in 6 months is adequate for them to understand the PSM issues!Organizational safety culture must come from the top and it is free to implement!
A recent OSHA report mentions the following:
Since the BP Texas City explosion in 2005, OSHA has counted over 20 serious incidents in refineries across the country.
Last year, OSHA completed an investigation of a naphtha piping failure and release, in which the resulting explosion and fire seriously injured three workers; two other workers, relatively young at 49 and 53 years old, died. One of these two workers was killed in the explosion; the other struggled for 13 days in the hospital before dying from severe burns. Within the unit where this rupture occurred, OSHA discovered multiple pipes that were operating below their retirement wall thickness. In fact, the very line that ruptured had previously ruptured and had to be replaced a decade earlier. As this tragedy makes clear, this type of breakdown maintenance is simply unacceptable. Good mechanical integrity programs are absolutely essential to safe refinery operation.
In 2007, water freezing in liquid propane piping resulted in a jet fire and a rapid evacuation of the entire refinery. Three workers, aged 33, 35, and 42 were seriously burned and hospitalized. Investigators found that a Process Hazard Analysis team had recommended installing remotely operable shut-off valves, yet the recommendation was improperly closed as "complete" by the previous owner. In fact, the valves had not been installed at all. The lack of these shut-off valves impeded workers' ability to control the propane release before it ignited. The refinery learned a hard lesson: It is essential to rigorously follow up on PHA findings to ensure that hazards are adequately controlled. Failure to abate serious hazards can have deadly consequences.
In 2008, at another facility, an explosion in a hydrocracking unit blew the head off a process water filter. The debris struck and killed a foreman; he was 53 and had been with the company for 30 years. OSHA's investigation revealed that an inadequate start-up procedure had allowed hydrogen gas and air to accumulate in the top of the filter where it was likely ignited by pyrophoric deposits. OSHA learned that some operators had recognized the hazard and used an undocumented alternate approach that was actually safer, but the procedure had never been updated to incorporate the safer practice. The result of following the faulty procedure was a violent explosion and the needless death of a refinery worker ? and a reminder that having safe, complete, and accurate operating procedures is essential to safe operations in process units.