November 19, 2013

Fatality due to gas powered generator

In 2007, a pipeline x ray technician who was developing films in a portable darkroom died due to CO poisoning caused by a gas powered generator. If you use diesel or gas powered generators inside closed spaces, be careful as CO will accumulate. Read the fatal alert in this link.

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November 15, 2013

Fire in Chevron Refinery

Fire in refinery


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Lightning causes tank to explode

A salt water tank containing trace amounts of hydrocarbon exploded in the USA after a lightning strike. The explosion of the tank caused other nearby tanks also to catch fire. This incident highlights the importance of maintaining the integrity of your lightning protection system. Many plant managers do not pay heed to this protection system, thinking it will never happen.
Read about the incident and see a video in this link

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November 8, 2013

Chevron Fire One Year Later - What Will It Take to Prevent Another? - New America Media

Excellent article!

Chevron Fire One Year Later - What Will It Take to Prevent Another? - New America Media

"There needs to be a fundamental shift of the burden of proof that a company is operating safely. Right now, the burden of proof lies with public agencies; they’re charged with playing Sherlock Holmes and trying to find hazardous conditions. What’s needed is to shift the burden of responsibility for safe operation to the plant. They have to demonstrate their competence in health, safety, and environmental performance as a condition of operation. Then a public agency can determine whether the plant is meeting those standards, and whether they’re sufficiently competent or not. That would change things. And, if the whole process is much more transparent and accessible to the public, that would make health, safety, and environmental performance much more compelling to the plant management".

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Structural integrity failure incident

A newly constructed dome for storing iron ore collapsed. Luckily no one was injured. See the pictures and article in this link. The cause of incident is under investigation.

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November 5, 2013

Trevor Kletz passes away

The father of process safety has passed away at the age of 91. Dr Trevor Kletz had authored many books on process safety and also introduced the concept of inherent safety much before the Bhopal disaster. My early working days were spent devouring his well written books and his subtle sense of humour. I  pray his soul rest in peace!

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November 4, 2013

Another view of behaviour based safety programs

I have always maintained the view that behaviour based safety programs will succeed only if top managements behaviour is also observed and corrected. Read an interesting article from a unions perspective in this link. This article should be read by all top management.

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November 2, 2013

HPCL Fire investigation

 According to a Times of India report, the Oil Industry safety directorate has faulted HPCL management for the August 23rd inferno in the cooling tower which claimed 28 lives.The article mentions the following:
"Revealing the lack of precautions taken by HPCL-Visakha Refinery, OISD said that internal pre-commissioning safety audit was done by a multi-disciplinary team of HPCL but the "recommendations/ pending jobs were not completed".
The lapses list
** Management failed to stop commissioning even though several processes remained unfinished
** Nearly 100 personnel were allowed to be present and work at the site during commissioning
** No senior official was available at the site and commissioning activity was left to one supervisor only
** Hazard identification not done and no risk analysis carried out
** Hot job carried out under the supervision of the maintenance department
** Contract workers not told to leave the site before the commissioning of the facilit
  Read the article in this link.

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