Lock out, tag out and Try out

At 8:30 a.m. on March 6, 2017, Employee #1 was using an eight foot A-frame fiberglass ladder to remove the steel top cover of the natural gas fuel filtration skid and replace the filters. The employee began to unbolt the steel top cover when it exploded and struck the employee. Employee #1 did not lock out/tag out, nor was the vessel de-energized/purged prior to removing the top cover. The employee sustained blunt force trauma to his body, causing complete amputation of both arms, killing him.
Source:Osha.gov

Are you locking out ALL sources of energy?

On December 28, 2006, Employee #1, a temporary employee, was working as an oil well pumper. He was sent to investigate squeaking belts on well number 11, a Lufkin Pumping unit. Employee #1 did not lockout the pumping unit prior to entering the fenced area, and the counter weight of the pumping unit struck Employee #1 in the head, killing him.
Source Osha.gov

Are you selecting the right sensors?

At approximately 9:40 p.m. on the evening of June 29, 2010, an ignition source in a solvent sludge feed tank ignited flammable solvent vapor. The vapor was in the head space of a partially filled atmospheric tank, either tank Q and/or tank R in the E-II solvent sludge feed tank area. The explosion flame front spread to the adjacent tank, and as a result, both tank covers were removed by the force of the event. The tank cover for tank Q was peeled back to the east but still partially attached. The tank cover for tank R was jettisoned; it struck the E-II processing building to the northwest in several locations before landing on the roof of the Dock 4/5 building to the east. The subsequent tank fires resulting from the explosion were extinguished by the local fire department. The likely ignition source was determined to be ultrasonic high-level sensors within the solvent sludge feed tanks. Apparently they had separated due to solvent degradation, exposing internal wiring. There were no injuries or fatalities.

Do not enter confined spaces without a proper permit even for a short time!

On May 5, 2018, Employee #1 was retrieving a plastic liner bag from a chemical container that had fallen into Reactor CP-2; a confined space. The permitting process, including air monitoring and setting up of ventilation, had not been conducted. As Employee #1 descended a ladder to access the reactor, he passed out at the first rung and fell to the bottom of the reactor. A coworker, who witnessed Employee#1 enter the space, contacted the control room to notify them of the incident. Emergency services were contacted and, upon arrival, recovered Employee #1 from the reactor. Employee #1 was determined dead. Air monitoring conducted by emergency services, following the incident, showed an oxygen concentration of eleven percent.
Source: OSHA.gov

Do you issue confined space entry permit for tankers?

Employee #1 was power washing the outside of the semi-truck tanker trailer. The employee entered the tanker trailer to wash the inside and was not found for two hours. The fire department was called to rescue the employee. Atmospheric monitoring found atmospheric levels of hydrogen sulfide at 100 ppm and hydrogen cyanide at 30 ppm. No written evidence of atmospheric monitoring was available following the employee's recovery from the space, and no ventilation of the space prior to or during the entry was performed. No attendant or entry supervisor was assigned to the entry. Employee #1's death was determined to be chemical asphyxia by vitiated atmosphere with hydrogen sulfide and hydrogen cyanide gasses.
Source: www.osha.gov