R & D and Pilot Plant Vs Process Safety

I visit a number of pilot plants that are run by the R & D department of companies. I see a common trend that affects process safety. In many plants, the R &D and pilot plant is being run by competent doctorates in Chemistry. However, designing and operating a pilot plant requires knowledge of chemical engineering principles. The common gap I observe is the lack of application of chemical engineering principles when pilot plants are attached to R & D setups. Ideally the pilot plant must be designed by technical personnel and operated by experienced plant operators, in the presence of R & D personnel. What is occurring in your unit?

Nuclear Safety in India - lessons to learn

The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited had conducted an extensive study on the safety of the existing nuclear power generation facilities after the Fukushima disaster. Their recommendations are given as follows:
"The four task forces after evaluating the four different designs of reactors in NPCIL fleet have come out with certain recommendations which are common to all the types of NPCIL reactors. These are:

• Provision of automatic reactor trip on seismic event at all plants except where it is already available (NAPS & KAPS)
• Additional Diesel operated fire tenders and diesel operated pumps to enable water addition at high and low pressures to the different systems based on the need.
• Diesel driven electric generators (air cooled and not requiring external cooling) to cater to power needs.
• Use of nitrogen gas from liquid nitrogen tanks to passively pressurize water tanks and transfer the water to systems at required pressure.
• Provisions to use water from suppression pool except in RAPS-2 
• Qualifying existing water storages/tanks in the plants like deaerator storage tanks, for earthquake resistance
• Conditioning signal override facility for ECCS in PHWRs where it is not available.
• Additional Battery operated devices to monitor important plant parameters
• Providing shore protection structures to withstand tsunami at coastal plants where they are not available
• Review of Emergency Operating Procedures for external events and retraining of operator
• Alternate make up provisions for spent fuel pool during extended station black out
• Feasibility of providing solar powered lighting
• Provision of boreholes at suitable locations to augment water supply.
• Provision of suitably designed flood proof enclosure and doors for important safety related electrical power sources
• Review of containment venting provisions at suitable points to vent the containment structure to stack" 

Read the complete report in this link.
While appreciating the work done by the NPCIL, there are lessons also to learn from them in the field of process safety also.

Four Process Incidents

A spate of process incidents have been reported in the past week.
In Kuwait, in a major refinery 4 Indian contract workers were killed due to exposure to a "gas" during maintenance work in a gas liquefaction unit. Read about it in this link.
A major fire has been reported in Dallas in a chemical mixing plant. The fire apparently overwhelmed the sprinkler system and destroyed a fire truck. Massive explosions are heard in the video. Read about it in this link. See the video in this link.
In India an explosion has taken place in a fireworks manufacturing facility killing two people. A news article in the Times Of India mentions that "This takes the number of deaths in the fireworks industries to 26 this year, making it the highest death toll recorded in recent years. The latest mishap is the fifth major accident in 2011". Read about it in this link.
In a fertilizer plant in USA, while workers were performing hot work on tank containing aqua ammonia an explosion occurred. Be very careful when doing hot work on tanks. They may appear harmless but are very dangerous! See the video in this link.

PSM and Money

I am slightly changing a statement made by the great Mahatma Gandhi (Earth has enough for every man’s  need but not enough for every man’s greed), to suit process safety management – PSM has enough for every man’s need but not for every man’s greed! In PSM’s context, by “greed”, I mean pressure to cut costs and increase profits without looking at the process safety consequences. Time and again, when you look at various incidents that have occurred and continue to occur even today around the World, the finger points towards cost cutting or insufficient budgets implicitly affecting process safety performance. Whatever model of PSM you adopt, “greed” cannot be managed by a system– is has to be managed by a human being and that too the ones at the top.  .They can manage this only by understanding the consequences of their actions. Not understanding the consequence of a decision that involves cost cutting or even by not properly allocating and approving budgets can have serious consequences on any process safety management system. Even though you might have implemented a system that addresses cost cutting etc, such systems have a tendency to get bypassed in times of pressure.This happens even in the "best" of companies. Any solutions???

Cathodic protection and process safety

Any corrosion protection system is an integral part of  maintaining process safety. One of them is cathodic protection. For a plant operator, these systems are seldom seen and operators are often not trained on the importance of these systems. A good interview by the Australian Pipeliner with Mr Mark Drager stresses the following points:
"Typically there are two types of CP systems:
Impressed – This CP system works by applying a small current (typically milliamps per kilometre) to the pipeline via units known as transformer-rectifiers. These units convert AC electricity into DC and use this electricity to lower the ‘energy’ of the pipeline. This system enables an asset owner to protect several kilometres of pipeline, provided the AC power remains connected.
Sacrificial – This CP system essentially performs a similar function via the electrical connection made between the pipeline and the buried anodes, namely zinc or magnesium. This system differs in that the DC electricity generated is due to the galvanic difference between the pipeline and the anodes. This system is also limited in protection range but is relatively maintenance free, however the anodes have a finite life and will need to be replaced.
There are few limitations to the usage of CP, but all can be overcome through careful design, construction and operation:

• Excessive negative potentials;
• May cause pipeline coating disbondment due to the excess hydrogen evolution;
• In some instances hydrogen cracks have also developed within pipelines due to the excess hydrogen evolution;
• Combined with the incorrect coating selected for the operating conditions, it may contribute to the development of stress corrosion cracks;
• Interference (stray currents) from the anode bed can affect neighbouring foreign utilities if the location of the anode bed is too close them; and,
• Disbonded coating or other foreign objects located next to the pipeline can cause a shielding effect. This would mean that the pipeline could not be protected locally at that point of shielding."

Read the full interview with more details in this link.