This is a must see for all those involved in hot work, including chemical, oil and gas and food processing industries. What surprises me is that the same mistakes are being repeated again and again. India, with its very young workforce needs to keep educating its workforce and this CSB video is excellent. I myself have witnessed three fatalities due to hot work incidents similar to those described over 25 years ag0.
See the video in this link. Kudos to the CSB!
June 9, 2010
Bhopal Gas Disaster - Precedence of Profits over People?
As expected the verdict on the Bhopal gas disaster in the Indian court has raised a hue and cry in the media. While definitely agreeing that the verdict is too little,too late, I think we are missing the bigger picture here. What has India done to prevent another Bhopal type of disaster? In the USA, OSHA CFR1910.119 Process Safety Management became mandatory in 1992 for facilities handling, storing and manufacturing highly hazardous chemicals above a certain threshold quantity. There is no such rule in India even today. Why? Even the enforcement of the other existing rules is weak due to rampant corruption. I quote from MJ Akbar's article in the Times of India:
"If there is any explanation for Delhi's fudge-and-fuss approach, it can only lie in the Indian elite's very real indifference to the poor. What, one wonders, would have been the reaction if Carbide had leaked its poison over Lutyens' Delhi rather than five kilometers from the old Bhopal city? Would Anderson have spent 25 years in Tihar rather than a villa in Hampton's?"
Read MJ Akbars article written before the verdict in this link
"If there is any explanation for Delhi's fudge-and-fuss approach, it can only lie in the Indian elite's very real indifference to the poor. What, one wonders, would have been the reaction if Carbide had leaked its poison over Lutyens' Delhi rather than five kilometers from the old Bhopal city? Would Anderson have spent 25 years in Tihar rather than a villa in Hampton's?"
Read MJ Akbars article written before the verdict in this link
Decisions and Disasters -2
A friend of mine who is in top management in a large organization sent me this article about the BP oil spill, highlighting the following points:
"With the schedule slipping, Williams says a BP manager ordered a faster pace.Williams says going faster caused the bottom of the well to split open, swallowing tools and that drilling fluid called "mud."
We actually got stuck. And we got stuck so bad we had to send tools down into the drill pipe and sever the pipe,Williams explained.There's always pressure, but yes, the pressure was increased.He discovered chunks of rubber in the drilling fluid. He thought it was important enough to gather this double handful of chunks of rubber and bring them into the driller shack. I recall asking the supervisor if this was out of the ordinary. And he says, 'Oh, it's no big deal.' And I thought, 'How can it be not a big deal? There's chunks of our seal is now missing,'Williams told Pelley.
The BOP is operated from the surface by wires connected to two control pods; one is a back-up. Williams says one pod lost some of its function weeks before. "The communication seemed to break down as to who was ultimately in charge," Williams said. What strikes Bea is Williams' description of the blowout preventer. Williams says in a drilling accident four weeks before the explosion, the critical rubber gasket, called an "annular," was damaged and pieces of it started coming out of the well.
Investigators have also found the BOP had a hydraulic leak and a weak battery".
Read the full article in this link
"With the schedule slipping, Williams says a BP manager ordered a faster pace.Williams says going faster caused the bottom of the well to split open, swallowing tools and that drilling fluid called "mud."
We actually got stuck. And we got stuck so bad we had to send tools down into the drill pipe and sever the pipe,Williams explained.There's always pressure, but yes, the pressure was increased.He discovered chunks of rubber in the drilling fluid. He thought it was important enough to gather this double handful of chunks of rubber and bring them into the driller shack. I recall asking the supervisor if this was out of the ordinary. And he says, 'Oh, it's no big deal.' And I thought, 'How can it be not a big deal? There's chunks of our seal is now missing,'Williams told Pelley.
The BOP is operated from the surface by wires connected to two control pods; one is a back-up. Williams says one pod lost some of its function weeks before. "The communication seemed to break down as to who was ultimately in charge," Williams said. What strikes Bea is Williams' description of the blowout preventer. Williams says in a drilling accident four weeks before the explosion, the critical rubber gasket, called an "annular," was damaged and pieces of it started coming out of the well.
Investigators have also found the BOP had a hydraulic leak and a weak battery".
Read the full article in this link
Labels:
BP Oil Rig Disaster
June 6, 2010
Process Safety Two Day Training at Chennai on 12th and 13th August,2010
Folks!
I am pleased to announce a two day training session on Process Safety Management on August 12th and 13th,2010 at Chennai. The course is a highly practical one and will benefit the participants. For further details please see this link.
If you want the brochure and booking form to be sent to you, please contact me at bkprism@gmail.com
I am pleased to announce a two day training session on Process Safety Management on August 12th and 13th,2010 at Chennai. The course is a highly practical one and will benefit the participants. For further details please see this link.
If you want the brochure and booking form to be sent to you, please contact me at bkprism@gmail.com
June 4, 2010
Process Safety and POP's
No, I am not talking about Persistent Organic Pollutants! I'm talking about Pressure On Profits. Time and again, we see accidents happening even in the World's biggest companies who have all systems in place including OHSAS 18001,ISO14001,PSM, behaviour based safety and other programs, conducted HAZOP and LOPA studies etc. A current example is the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.Why does this happen? While everyone agrees that ultimately it is the human being who is the weakest link in any system, how do we ensure that safety is always looked at all times including times of pressure on profits? On one side OSHA is increasing the monetary penalties for deficiencies. Whether this will spur organizations to invest in process safety – we will have to wait and see. Ultimately decisions linked to spending and investments have a cascading effect on the whole organisation and finally lead to an accident. I was talking to the Head of Safety of a large organisation who had done a HAZOP study for a new facility. He lamented the fact that even though he had presented to the board the fact that the new plant was commissioned with only 50% of the HAZOP study recommendations implemented, there was no reaction from the board! This could be due to two reasons – a lack of perception of process safety risk and the lack of competence required to understand it. It’s a chicken and egg situation. The Baker Panel report on the BP Texas refinery accident in 2005 had suggested that BP appoint a person with process safety knowledge on its board, but as far as I know, BP has not appointed anyone.
Labels:
Organisational Culture