Flammable atmosphere + static charge = explosion

At about 2:00 a.m. on October 15, 1990, Employee #1 was transferring an approximately 20 percent monoethanolamine (ethanolamine) solution from a process vessel, the amine regenerator, to the top of an 11,000 gallon aluminum storage tank. The ethanolamine solution had apparently entrained hydrogen gas, some of which released to the atmosphere of the storage tank upon transfer and apparently caused the hydrogen gas concentration in the tank to exceed 4 percent. A source of ignition, possibly the static charge of the falling ethanolamine solution, caused the hydrogen to explode. Employee #1 was engulfed in the release of ethanolamine solution from the ruptured tank and sustained chemical burns to his left eye. The storage tank was damaged beyond repair, and piping, valves, and windows in the immediate area were destroyed. Damage was estimated at $70,000.

Source:OSHA.gov

Know the location of your emergency shutoff valve switches

Employees #1 and #5 through #7 were near the chlorine unloading area at a bleach plant when the gasket of a recently-installed vaporizer failed, releasing between 500 and 700 gallons of liquid chlorine. When Employees #1 and #7 went to investigate the extent and location of the leak, they found an overwhelming concentration of the chemical. They were not using SCBAs, nor was Employee #6, who used the wrong escape route. Employee #5, the bleach plant operator, attempted to find and assist Employee #6. 

Employees #2 through #4 attempted to shut down the vaporizer system but they did not know the location of the one critical shut-off valve, and the key person was not immediately available to help. Employees #1 through #7 suffered chemical burns from inhaling the chlorine fumes; all were hospitalized except for Employee #2.

Source:OSHA.gov

Handle chemicals with care!

 At approximately 3:00 p.m. on April 29, 1991, Employee #1 was pouring caustic soda into a tank containing water when a flash steam explosion occurred and he was splashed by the solution. His supervisor saw what happened, grabbed Employee #1, and plunged him into a neighboring tank of water. The supervisor told him to get medical treatment, but Employee #1 initially refused. When he could no longer stand the pain, he took himself to the Burn Unit, where he was treated and released. This was not a serious injury accident. The cause of the accident was the reaction of the chemical with water. The water was warm, and the rapid addition of the caustic soda caused the soda to pile up on the bottom of the tank. The increasing heat resulted in the explosion. The supervisor said that he had trained Employee #1 on how to perform this task safely. Employee #1 had been doing it for two months prior to the accident. A coworker who witnessed the accident said that he had also been trained on how to safely complete the procedure. To prevent a recurrence, Employee #1 was to be retrained when he returned to work.

Source:OSHA.gov

Have you identified incompatible chemicals in your facility?

On August 6, 1999, Employees #1 through #5 were present during a transfer operation involving sodium hypochlorite. A chemical reaction occurred between the sodium hypochlorite and an incompatible chemical, causing the tank to erupt. Employee #1 was killed. Employees #2 through #5 sustained injuries, for which Employees #2 and #3 were hospitalized.

Source:OSHA.gov

Are you inspecting your expansion joints?

At 1:45 a.m. there was an accidental release of chemical vapors. Carbon tetrachloride, containing chlorine and hydrochloric acid, formed a cloud after being released through a failed expansion joint on a chlorine absorber feed cooler inlet. Employees #1 through #6 were injured when they inhaled the vapors. Three of them were hospitalized.

Source:OSHA.gov

Eleven Employees Exposed to Phosgene Release

The resin plant was a six-story, open-sided structure, approximately 100 feet wide and 400 feet long, which sat approximately 50 feet east of the phosgene plant. A street separated the two plants, but they were connected physically by a pipe rack, which held phosgene-conveying pipes. On May 22, 1996, a number of employees were working on the second-floor mezzanine of the resin plant, removing a caustic line so that they could install a heat exchanger for the caustic scrubber system. While they were working, low levels of phosgene vented back through the caustic line. After the phosgene release was detected, the employees evacuated the resin plant. The company did not provide emergency escape respirators for  the  employees in the resin plant, and none of the employees who evacuated the plant were wearing respirators. After evacuation, the on-site physician examined 11 employees and referred them to a hospital  where they were examined further and provided prophylactic treatment. Eight employees stayed overnight for observation and were released the next day.

Source:OSHA.gov

Employees injured when failed acid gas scrubber released gas

During batch production of bifenthrin, gases are normally released in the reactor vessel and are delivered by a closed system to an acid gas scrubber for neutralization with sodium hydroxide. This scrubber failed because the sodium hydroxide feed line clogged, releasing a plume that was probably a mixture of hydrochloric acid and sulfur dioxide gases. The plume was blown across the facility, including the chemical laboratory where technicians and supervisors were working. The chem lab's own HVAC system pulled some of the plume into the building, driving out the five technicians and one supervisor, who were choking, coughing, and having difficulty breathing. Two employees had been walking to a job site and had encountered the same plume. The plant nurse had been alerted and administered oxygen until the ambulances arrived and took Employees #1 through #8 to local hospitals. The employer had extensive written emergency response and evacuation procedures that are practiced six times a year, and designated employees are given emergency response training (emergency respirator use, confined space entry, acid spill containment) weekly. No violations were noted with procedures or responses.

Source:OSHA.gov

Firefighter injured when struck by uncontrolled hose

Employee #1 and two coworkers were on a hose line, fighting a blaze. The pumper tank went dry before the hydrant supply was connected, causing the hose to lose water pressure. The incident commander left the hose line to see what was interrupting the water supply. When the water pressure suddenly returned, Employee 31 and the other coworker lost control of the hose as it whipped up and back. Employee #1 sustained a serious head injury. Several errors contributed to this accident: the driver/pump operator parked the pump truck in a position that blocked his view of the nozzle operation, so he was unable to use inlets on the pump panel side of the truck; the driver/pump operator did not use gate controls prior to receiving the external (hydrant) water supply; the incident commander failed to maintain a minimum of three firefighters equipped with hose straps on the hose line; and the hose crew failed to shut down the nozzle when water pressure was lost.

Source:OSHA.gov