Employee is killed when overexposed to H2S during confined space entry

 "At 12:30 p.m. on June 7, 2021, an employee entered a sewer manhole to estimate the amount of materials needed to perform a manhole repair when the employee was overcome by high levels of hydrogen sulfide at the base of the manhole shortly after entry. The employee did not perform atmospheric monitoring and had not donned his harness with rescue tripod before entry into the confined space. A four gas monitor and rescue equipment were located in the employee's work vehicle. Coworker #1 (attendant) and Coworker #2 (helper) were not trained or equipped for performing a confined space entry rescue. A volunteer fire department responded within 8 minutes and performed the confined space entry rescue shortly after arrival. The employee was killed by overexposure to hydrogen sulfide"

SOurce: OSHA.gov.

Four Employees Are Chemically Poisoned with Epichlorohydrin

On May 17, 2010 Employee #1, Employee #2, Employee #3 and Employee #4, were in the pipe rack planning to install a flanged spool piece on the Epi three transfer line. The line had been isolated at the west end and the east end. A one inch bleeder valve on both ends was yellow tagged open and returned to operations. 

Employee #1, Employee #2, and Employee #3 had pulled their tools and bolts up. Employee #4, the rigger had gone up to the job site to figure out the best way to lift the pipe spool in place. As all this was going on, an employee of the host employer connected an eighty pound nitrogen hose to the one inch bleeder. That worker then charged the line with the eighty pounds of nitrogen. 

Shortly after that, ten gallons of epichlorohydrin was released from the west end of the open pipe hitting Employee #1 directly in the chest and midsection. Employee #1 was admitted to the hospital immediately by life flight. Employee #2 was exposed on the neck, back and hands, and admitted to the hospital. Employee #3 had mild splotchy discoloration of several small areas on the hand and arms. Also a sore throat from inhalation. Employee #4 had splotchy superficial burns on the arms and back as well as a mild associated rash.

Source:OSHA.gov

Hydrotest fatility

"At 1:00 p.m. on September 27, 1993, a hydrostatic test crew operator and two helpers began testing 19 sections of 7 inch P-110 casing pipe at 9,500 psi.

The hydrostatic crew would roll the pipe onto the holding devices, check the drift (proper dimensions), apply thread dope, install the front header plug and rear "gun" plug, align the header plug bleed valve, fill the pipe with water, close the bleed valve, tighten the header plug, and assume their designated positions for pressure testing in accordance with pressure test specifications. 

After conducting the pressure test, employees would drain the water, remove the plugs, roll the pipe down the line, grease the threads, and stencil the pipe. 

Near 4:00 p.m. the crew was working on pipe section number 18. About 4:15 p.m., the pipe was filled with water and the crew began the pressure test. At 1,000 psi the header plug exploded blew out of the coupler on the pipe and struck Employee #1. Coworkers rushed to his aid and emergency medical services were notified. CPR was administered. Medical services arrived and transported Employee #1 to the hospital, where he died at about 5:00 p.m". 

Source: OSHA.gov

CO2 pipeline incident due to landslide

"On February 22, 2020, a carbon dioxide (CO2) pipeline ruptured in proximity to the community of Satartia, Mississippi. The rupture followed heavy rains that resulted in a landslide, creating excessive axial strain on a pipeline weld.
• Carbon dioxide is considered minimally toxic by inhalation and is classified as an asphyxiant,
displacing the oxygen in air. Symptoms of CO2 exposure may include headache and drowsiness.
Individuals exposed to higher concentrations may experience rapid breathing, confusion,
increased cardiac output, elevated blood pressure, and increased arrhythmias. Extreme CO2
concentrations can lead to death by asphyxiation.
• When CO2 in a super-critical phase (which is common for CO2 pipelines) releases into open air, it
naturally vaporizes into a heavier than air gas and dissipates. During the February 22 event,
atmospheric conditions and unique topographical features of the accident site significantly
delayed dissipation of the heavier-than-air vapor cloud. Pipeline operators are required to
establish atmospheric models to prepare for emergencies

• Local emergency responders were not informed of the rupture and the nature of the
unique safety risks of the CO2 pipeline. As a result, responders had to guess the nature of the risk,
in part making assumptions based on reports of a “green gas” and “rotten egg smell” and had to
contemplate appropriate mitigative actions. Fortunately, responders decided to quickly isolate
the affected area by shutting down local highways and evacuating people in proximity to the
release. No fatalities were reported.
• This event demonstrated the need for:
o Pipeline company awareness and mitigation efforts directed at addressing integrity
threats due to changing climate, geohazards, and soil stability issues.
o Improved public engagement efforts to ensure public and emergency responder
awareness of nearby CO2 pipeline and pipeline facilities and what to do if a CO2 release
occurs. This is especially important for communities in low-lying areas, with certain
topographical features such as rivers and valleys". 

Source: https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/Failure%20Investigation%20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf

Two employees killed when natural gas pipeline explodes

 At approximately 3:30 p.m. on June 14, 2012, Employee #1 was performing hydro testing of two recently constructed and installed crude oil pipelines. The employee removed a pressure test manifold from a pressure test flange while the pipeline contained a pressure of 2000 psi. Employee #1 did not lock-out the pipe valves, nor bleed the pressure off of the line prior to removing the pressure test manifold. The employee was struck-by the pressure test manifold that was propelled by the stored pipeline pressure. Employee #1 was transported by the impact of the manifold for a distance of 40 feet. The steel pressure test manifold impacted the skull of the employee which resulted in injuries to the employee and subsequent death. 

Source:OSHA.gov

PRESSURE TESTING FATALITY

 At approximately 3:30 p.m. on June 14, 2012, Employee #1 was performing hydro testing of two recently constructed and installed crude oil pipelines. The employee removed a pressure test manifold from a pressure test flange while the pipeline contained a pressure of 2000 psi. Employee #1 did not lock-out the pipe valves, nor bleed the pressure off of the line prior to removing the pressure test manifold. The employee was struck-by the pressure test manifold that was propelled by the stored pipeline pressure. Employee #1 was transported by the impact of the manifold for a distance of 40 feet. The steel pressure test manifold impacted the skull of the employee which resulted in injuries to the employee and subsequent death. 

Source: OSHA.gov

Note: Obviously the pipeline was not filled up complete;y with water and air was pressurized, resulting in the propelling of the pressure test manifold