On August 6, 1999, Employees #1 through #5 were present during a transfer operation involving sodium hypochlorite. A chemical reaction occurred between the sodium hypochlorite and an incompatible chemical, causing the tank to erupt. Employee #1 was killed. Employees #2 through #5 sustained injuries, for which Employees #2 and #3 were hospitalized.
Source:OSHA.gov
The resin plant was a six-story, open-sided structure, approximately 100 feet wide and 400 feet long, which sat approximately 50 feet east of the phosgene plant. A street separated the two plants, but they were connected physically by a pipe rack, which held phosgene-conveying pipes. On May 22, 1996, a number of employees were working on the second-floor mezzanine of the resin plant, removing a caustic line so that they could install a heat exchanger for the caustic scrubber system. While they were working, low levels of phosgene vented back through the caustic line. After the phosgene release was detected, the employees evacuated the resin plant. The company did not provide emergency escape respirators for the employees in the resin plant, and none of the employees who evacuated the plant were wearing respirators. After evacuation, the on-site physician examined 11 employees and referred them to a hospital where they were examined further and provided prophylactic treatment. Eight employees stayed overnight for observation and were released the next day.
Source:OSHA.gov
During batch production of bifenthrin, gases are normally released in the reactor vessel and are delivered by a closed system to an acid gas scrubber for neutralization with sodium hydroxide. This scrubber failed because the sodium hydroxide feed line clogged, releasing a plume that was probably a mixture of hydrochloric acid and sulfur dioxide gases. The plume was blown across the facility, including the chemical laboratory where technicians and supervisors were working. The chem lab's own HVAC system pulled some of the plume into the building, driving out the five technicians and one supervisor, who were choking, coughing, and having difficulty breathing. Two employees had been walking to a job site and had encountered the same plume. The plant nurse had been alerted and administered oxygen until the ambulances arrived and took Employees #1 through #8 to local hospitals. The employer had extensive written emergency response and evacuation procedures that are practiced six times a year, and designated employees are given emergency response training (emergency respirator use, confined space entry, acid spill containment) weekly. No violations were noted with procedures or responses.
Source:OSHA.gov
At 7:00 a.m. on June 6, 2019, an employee was changing an "O" ring on a sight glass for a heat sensor on a 3-inch pipe on line #9 in the central clean-in-place room. The employee was changing the gasket when residual hot water and chemical mix in the line that had not been properly drained and isolated sprayed out onto him. The employee sustained second degree burns and was hospitalized.
Source: OSHA.gov
Employees #1 and #5 through #7 were near the chlorine unloading area at a bleach plant when the gasket of a recently-installed vaporizer failed, releasing between 500 and 700 gallons of liquid chlorine. When Employees #1 and #7 went to investigate the extent and location of the leak, they found an overwhelming concentration of the chemical. They were not using SCBAs, nor was Employee #6, who used the wrong escape route. Employee #5, the bleach plant operator, attempted to find and assist Employee #6. Employees #2 through #4 attempted to shut down the vaporizer system but they did not know the location of the one critical shut-off valve, and the key person was not immediately available to help. Employees #1 through #7 suffered chemical burns from inhaling the chlorine fumes; all were hospitalized except for Employee #2. Source:OSHA.gov
Employee #1, a millwright, was standing near a 100 ft long by 5 ft diameter vacuum fat-splitter vessel that was undergoing a hydrostatic test. He was by the M-1 flange joint when the gasket experienced a catastrophic failure. Employee #1 was struck in the face by air and water released at the maximum allowable working pressure of 1,275 psig. He was killed.
Source:OSHA.gov
On October 6, 1994, an employee, working in the surgical wing at the Hospital, was exposed to ethylene oxide gas from the sterilizer room. The monitor in the sterilizer room read 77 ppm. The solenoid from the boiler had failed, and a bad gasket released the gas throughout the surgical wing. Three nurses and one maintenance employee who was performing daily routine maintenance were also exposed. Hospital employees participated in an emergency response until the fire department arrived on site. None of the exposed employees required hospitalization.
(EO is used as a sterilizing agent in hospitals)
Source: OSHA.gov
On April 30, 1985, at approximately 6 am, an alarm sounded in the control room. The chemical technican on duty checked the pressure in the control room. It was all right. He then went downstairs to check the alarm system. It was functioning properly. As he went back up the stairs he saw the fire on the line from the ethylene oxide storage tank. The fire department was notified. The fire department had three rail cars moved because of their proximity to the fire. The outlet from the ethylene oxide tank was turned off. The fire burned down and was extinguished. The leak was caused by a ruptured flange gasket in the ethylene oxide line. When the ethylene oxide came into contact with the plastic insulating cover on the line it may have ignited. Rust on the line way also have been a catalyst in igniting the ethylene oxide.
Source:OSHA.gov
On April 6, 1994, a unit operator with ARCO Products was conducting rounds of the coker unit when he observed a leak coming from the mechanical seal of the heavy gas oil pump of coker unit #1. The operator decided to seek assistance; the head unit operator and six or seven unit operators responded. The operators placed water and steam on the leak to suppress the vapor from the seal. The head unit operator decided to shut down the pump and transfer the product to the secondary pump. As the operator shut down the primary pump, the mechanical seal blew, causing a vapor cloud to generate from the seal. The operators continued to put steam and water on the seal and isolated the pump from the pipe line. The remaining product in the pipe line leading to the primary heavy gas oil pump vaporized, leading to the dispersion of the vapor cloud. The operators who responded were wearing bunker gear and several wore emergency respirators. Those with respirators isolated the pump from the pipe line by closing the suction and discharge valves. The operators who were not wearing emergency respirators stationed themselves upwind of the vapor cloud and put water on the cloud; however, the wind changed direction several times, exposing unprotected operators to vapors. Employees #1 and #2, two unprotected operators who responded to incident, were brought to Long Beach Memorial Hospital to be treated for inhalation of hydrocarbons. Employee #1 was hospitalized.
Source: OSHA.gov
On July 14, 2009, Employees #1 and #2 were performing a pneumatic test to verify leak tightness of a new meter station at the Midcontinent Express Pipeline. The test medium was nitrogen gas, and the system being tested included piping and two pressure vessels. Numerous leaks were found in the system during the test. The system reached the required test pressure of 2225 psig at approximately 3:25 p.m., and Employee #1 observed that the pressure on the system had dropped to 2205 by approximately 3:30p.m. Employee #1 was then replaced at the test table by Employee #2. As Employee #1 walked away from the test table, the door on the PECO separator (a pressure vessel) blew off, releasing pressurized nitrogen gas that sent projectiles flying. Employee #2 was killed, and Employee #1 suffered burns and was hospitalized.
Source: OSHA.gov
Water Samples Tested After Maine Firefighting Foam Spill, Below Guidelines for Dangerous Chemicals.
Read in this link
Worst Manufacturing Incidents in the U.S.
And the lessons we learned to prevent history from repeating itself.
"A December 1984 toxic gas leak in Bhopal, India killed and maimed thousands and led to chronic health problems. Survivors of the tragedy—which has been called the worst industrial accident ever—came to Harvard Chan School on Sept. 23 as part of a U.S. tour to share their stories and to build support for activities related to the 40th anniversary."
Read the article in this link
"The clock at Gate 1 stopped at 3:43 p.m. The explosion that shook
the BASF site in Ludwigshafen at this time on July 28, 1948 wrought
unthinkable destruction in a place that was still being rebuilt
following the Second World War and which was still under French
occupation three years after the end of the war. The disaster created a
widespread stir as a result of extensive international press coverage.
Similarly, aid also came from virtually all over the world after the
explosion, and soldiers from both the French and the adjacent American
occupation zones immediately made their way to the site to assist."
An employee was cleaning the chemical reactor with a flammable mixture of solvents when the reactor burst its rupture disc and the mixture was expelled into the plant. The solvent ignited and the vapor cloud explosion resulted in the plant's 43 employees being injured by flying debris and/or being thrown by the force of the explosion. The employee and two others died from the explosion. Many were injured.
It appeared that the reactor was not vented to a safe location and had primitive temperature controls, and the company did not enforce the mandatory attendance of operators at the reactors during operation. All of these factors, including minimal operating procedures (none specifically for cleaning), led to the explosion and the resulting extensive injuries and property damage.
Source: Osha.gov
Employee #1 was placing the #6 water condenser back on line, leaving the drain valve open while he opened a valve under the condenser. Hydrofluoric acid suddenly drained into the catch basin/drain system, and splashed the employee. He suffered first- and second-degree burns and later died of cardiac arrest.
Siurce: OSHA.gov
