August 16, 2018
August 12, 2018
August 9, 2018
August 5, 2018
Level gauge and Bromine Transportation incident
Mixed acid charging in the reactor was in progress. Level gauge of mixed acid measuring vessel broke and mixed acid splashed on the body of two employees, injuring them seriously. Root Causes: Inadequate preventive maintenance, Employees not aware about potential hazard involved in the operation.
Transportation of Bromine carried out in glass bottle having 3 Kgs capacity in wooden box by goods vehicle. During transportation few bottles broken & started leaking. Due to leakage near by area affected with bromine gas. People around the area were affected due to inhalation. Root Causes: Inadequate packing of bromine bottle. Untrained driver.
Courtesy: A.G.Shingore, National Safety Council
Transportation of Bromine carried out in glass bottle having 3 Kgs capacity in wooden box by goods vehicle. During transportation few bottles broken & started leaking. Due to leakage near by area affected with bromine gas. People around the area were affected due to inhalation. Root Causes: Inadequate packing of bromine bottle. Untrained driver.
Courtesy: A.G.Shingore, National Safety Council
July 28, 2018
July 24, 2018
Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC)
Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC): An unplanned or uncontrolled release of material from primary containment, including non-toxic and non-flammable materials (e.g., steam, hot condensate, nitrogen, compressed CO2 or compressed air).
Source: CCPS Glossary
Source: CCPS Glossary
July 22, 2018
July 20, 2018
July 19, 2018
Controlling corrosion
Controlling corrosion: Roland Anderson, Executive VP at Cosasco, warns not to conflate cause and effect.
July 16, 2018
July 12, 2018
Lessons learnt from a refinery fire
- A fire started while draining naphtha from a pipeline that ran through a pump house at the refinery.
- Investigations revealed that there were three main lapses that led to the fire:
(a) The refinery had allowed its contractors to drain naphtha from the pipeline by allowing the naphtha to flow out from two open valves and an open flange joint of the pipeline into trays. This open system of de-oiling allowed naphtha vapour to escape into the atmosphere resulting in an accumulation of flammable vapour, which would in turn pose a danger of ignition.
(b) The refinery had allowed the use of a plastic tray, which was a non-conductive container, as a receptacle for collection of naphtha. The free fall of naphtha onto the plastic tray would allow accumulation of static charges as a result of the friction caused between them. When the accumulated static charges come into contact with any good conductor, they are instantaneously transferred to the conductor. A spark could be caused as a result of the sudden surge of energy during the transfer, which could be sufficient to ignite the naphtha vapour which is within flammable range in the atmosphere.
(c) The refinery failed to deploy portable gas monitors sufficiently close to the open de-oiling area to give the warning when the build-up of the flammable vapour reached an undesirable level.
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