December 27, 2012

List of frequently used tank standards

 Read a list of frequently used tanks design standards in this link. 

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December 20, 2012

Refinery explosion video

In September 2012 an explosion took place at a refinery in Mexico. Cause is being investigated. A you tube video of the explosion graphically demonstrates the severity of explosions. It is reported that 26 people were killed. See the video in this link. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5EhjBd_lY0
You will see an operator rolling in the ground in the foreground after the fireball.

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December 19, 2012

Hazards of nitrogen

Last month I had mentioned about a fatality of a trainee engineer due to nitrogen. See a ppt on the hazards of nitrogen in this link. Share it with all your colleagues.

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December 16, 2012

SIS in field instrumentation

 Read a good article http://www.automationworld.com/sis-field-instrumentation


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December 14, 2012

Water reactive chemical incident

In 1996, an OSHA office investigated an explosion and fire which occurred at a custom chemical blending ("toll blending") facility, resulting in the deaths of five employees and the destruction of the facility. The report mentions that "The employees were in the process of making "Gold Precipitating Agent" by blending 5,400 lbs. of sodium hydrosulfite, 1,800 lbs. of aluminum powder, 900 lbs. of potassium carbonate, and 8 liters of benzaldehyde. Sodium hydrosulfite and aluminum powder are highly water reactive and aluminum powder in this quantity has catastrophic potential. Neither of these materials are covered by 29 CFR 1910.119. The employer's representatives stated that they relied on the information in the material safety data sheets (MSDSs) to perform a brief hazard review. This review failed to identify the hazards of that mixture. The mixing was done in a 125 cubic foot blender that had a water-cooled mechanical seal. It is very likely that water inadvertently entered the blend. Mechanical seals are known throughout the industry to be prone to this type of failure. Symptoms of a leak were noted and reported, but only to employees who did not know that water reactive chemicals were to be blended. A mechanical problem developed with the liquid feed system, which had not been checked prior to the addition of the dry ingredients. This caused a deviation from the standard operating procedures and the dry ingredients remained in the blender for a much longer period than originally anticipated. Water entering the subsurface caused the sodium hydrosulfite and possibly the aluminum powder to react, slowly at first. The large volume of powder did not conduct heat readily and the exothermic reaction intensified. In response to noxious gases being released, the employer decided to unload the blender, based upon the information in the MSDS for the finished blend. During the unloading process, an ignition and explosion occurred, propelling the vessel and its concrete supports approximately 48 feet. The pressure wave destroyed part of the facility and caused four of the five deaths; the fifth employee was killed by the ensuing fire, which destroyed most of the plant"
Read the complete details in this link

 
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December 11, 2012

The importance of proper jointing of flanges

Many major incidents start with a leak from a flange joint that then escalates rapidly when the leaking chemical catches fire.   A good article on the proper jointing of flanges and gaskets is available in this link.

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December 9, 2012

Ethylene Oxide Safety

The American Chemistry Council has  a good Ethylene Oxide Product Stewardship guidebook which should be read by all people handling it. Read it in this link.

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December 7, 2012

Sight glass accident

Thanks to Abhay Gujar for sending news about a sight glass breakage incident which has reportedly killed one person in a refinery in the USA. Read about the incident in this link.

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Hazards of operating pumps in dead headed conditions

A safety alert mentions the dangers of operating pumps with suction and discharge closed and the pump continuing to operate, resulting in overheating of the trapped liquid inside the pump. Pump explosion incidents have been mentioned in the alert. The alert sends me back 30 years when I was shift in charge in an ammonia plant and a naphtha pump had been inadvertently started  with suction and discharge closed. It was my night shift and I was making my plant rounds soon after taking charge when I saw a red glow. I rushed to the spot and the whole pump was glowing red. I stopped the pump and we allowed it to cool down. Guess God was my saviour as I would not have been here today if the pump had exploded!!

Read the safety alert in this link.

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December 5, 2012

Refinery fire - update

Chevron has published a update in September on their findings of the refinery fire at Richmond. You can view it in this link.

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December 4, 2012

Lessons from Buncefield

Further to my post on the anniversary of Bhopal disaster, I am quoting below from the HSE UK report on the Buncefield oil depot fire (2005) investigation:

"This report does not identify any new learning about major accident prevention. Rather it serves to reinforce some important process safety management principles that have been known for some time:
There should be a clear understanding of major accident risks and the safety critical equipment and systems designed to control them.

This understanding should exist within organisations from the senior management down to the shop floor, and it needs to exist between all organisations involved in supplying, installing, maintaining and operating these controls.

There should be systems and a culture in place to detect signals of failure in safety critical equipment and to respond to them quickly and effectively.

In this case, there were clear signs that the equipment was not fit for purpose but no one questioned why, or what should be done about it other than ensure a series of temporary fixes.

Time and resources for process safety should be made available.

The pressures on staff and managers should be understood and managed so that they have the capacity to apply procedures and systems essential for safe operation.

Once all the above are in place: 

There should be effective auditing systems in place which test the quality of management systems and ensure that these systems are actually being used on the ground and are effective.

At the core of managing a major hazard business should be clear and positive process safety leadership with board-level involvement and competence to ensure that major hazard risks are being properly managed"
 

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December 3, 2012

National Process Safety Week on anniversary of Bhopal disaster December 3rd

Today is the 28th anniversary of the Bhopal gas disaster. We still do not seem to learn from Bhopal. The same mistakes that occurred at Bhopal keep recurring in various incidents around the World. Production pressures along with cost cutting measures take a toll on process safety. Just like the National safety week in march, I moot the idea of having a National Process Safety Week every year on the anniversary of Bhopal for all chemical industries in India. During this week, the root causes of the Bhopal disaster and process incidents in individual organisations can be discussed with all  employees including top management. The root causes are again given below: They are still relevant today:
1. Do not cut costs without looking at the effects on process safety
2. Maintain all your layers of defense including asset integrity
3. Continually ensure that competency of personnel operating and maintaining plants are updated and current
4. Be prepared for the worst case scenario.
5. Understand the risks and measures to eliminate / reduce or control them
6. Learn from your past incidents. Those who do not learn are condemned to repeat the incidents.
7. Pay heed to your process safety management system audit reports

 I am again attaching the link of some pictures of the victims of Bhopal, lest we forget..........

" Mothers didn't know their children had died, children didn't know their mothers had died, and men didn't know their whole families had died" - Ahmed Khan, Bhopal resident on the Bhopal disaster


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December 1, 2012

The hydrogen explosion at Fukushima

 For those of you who wondered how there could be a hydrogen explosion in the Fukushima incident, see the good powerpoint explanation given by Dragoslav Nikezic of the University of Kragujevac in this link. 

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